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1. A PROPOSAL REGARDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
WTO AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
The World Trade Organization ("WTO") should adopt the fol-
lowing proposal:
1. WTO Agreements
All provisions of WTO Agreements that regulate Regional
Trade Agreements ("RTAs") (and other similar but differently
named trade agreements) are amended to adopt the criteria below.
2. Application
A. Future RTAs. Future RTAs and ones presently under nego-
tiation are permitted only to the extent they comply with the pro-
visions below.
B. Extant RTAs. Existing RTAs are to be amended to include
the provisions below over a phase-in period of five years.
3. Harmonization
A. Crucial Rules. The WTO's Committee on RTAs ("CRTA")
will identify those WTO Rules to which RTA derogation is causing
or will likely cause institutional harm (conflicts and/or resource
diversion).
B. WTO Supremacy. Where RTA provisions are inconsistent
with those specified WTO Rules, those WTO Rules shall be su-
preme.
C. Dispute Settlement. The WTO's Dispute Settlement Body
("DSB") is either to be employed as the final arbiter of RTA dis-
putes or to supplant alternative arbiters completely. In deciding
these cases the DSB shall employ WTO jurisprudence to the extent
of any inconsistency with RTA jurisprudence.
4. Secretariat
A. Cooperation. When negotiating on RTA matters, Member
government officials should work in cooperation with the WTO
Secretariat throughout RTA negotiations and disputes to ensure
consistency and compliance with WTO Rules.
B. Use of Secretariat. The WTO Secretariat shall consider ways
in which it can assist RTAs with their institutional needs, including
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offering use of the WTO Secretariat to meet those RTA institutional
needs.
5. Waiver
A. Waiver Approval. In order to facilitate innovation and rec-
ognize arrangements suggesting significant integration of mem-
bers' economies and political structures, waiver of these provisions
may be permitted subject to two-thirds approval of the WTO
membership, following recommendation of the waiver by the
CRTA Executive Committee.
B. Non-Customs Unions. Such waivers are presumptively in-
applicable to non-customs union arrangements.
C. Time Limit. Waivers granted under this provision may ap-
ply for a maximum of ten years, subject to renewal under the same
criteria as the original waiver.
6. CRTA Executive Committee
A. CRTA Executive Committee Membership. The CRTA will
include a rotating fifteen-member Executive Committee comprised
of representatives from the different regions of the world, as well
as permanent representatives from the six largest exporting
economies, though no WTO member shall have more than one rep-
resentative on the committee at any one time.
B. Recommendations. Recommendations of the CRTA Execu-
tive Committee are to be issued only with the support of two-
thirds of the members of the CRTA Executive Committee.
2. INTRODUcTION
As we approach the Sixth Ministerial Conference' of the WTO,
there is a distinct possibility that it, like previous WTO Ministeri-
als, may be doomed to failure or, at a minimum, will not achieve
even a part of its goals. Indeed, the most recent Ministerial, the
Cancun Ministerial in 2003, is generally considered to have failed.
2
1 See World Trade Organization, The Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference (noting
that the Sixth World Trade Organization ("WTO") Ministerial Conference will be
in Hong Kong from December 13-18, 2005), at http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto-e/minist-e/min05_e/min05_e.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2005).
2 See Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Con-
ference in Cancan and the Future Of Trade Constitution, 7 J. INf'L ECON. L. 219 (2004)
[hereinafter Cho, A Bridge Too Far] (calling the Cancun Ministerial a fiasco and ex-
plaining why the Conference failed); see also WTO, The Fifth WTO Ministerial Con-
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That failure may be attributed to many causes, including the fail-
ure to agree on such crucial issues as agricultural supports, compe-
tition policy, investment rules, procurement, and intellectual prop-
erty rights.3  Further failures like the Cancun and Seattle
Ministerials could place the WTO at risk of stagnation and irrele-
vance.
There are many substantive reasons for WTO members' dis-
agreements. This Article will focus on just one of those reasons:
the increasing prevalence of regional trade agreements ("RTAs").
RTAs have grown at a phenomenal rate, from 50 in 1990 to over
230 today, and are a significant contributing factor to the present
difficulties of the WTO.4 Despite the specific benefits of individual
RTAs, when taken as a whole, they tend to undermine the devel-
opment of the multilateral trade system. Specifically, they pose an
institutional threat to the WTO.
Traditionally, however, RTAs have been examined through an
economic and not an institutional lens. Those critiques have fo-
cused on trade patterns and efficiencies, and specifically on RTA
attacks on the Most Favored Nation ("MFN") principle-one of the
bedrocks of the movement to liberalize world trade.5 RTAs' im-
ference (noting that the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference was held in Cancin,
Mexico from September 10-14, 2003), at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/
ministe/min03e/min03_e. htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2005).
3 See Cho, A Bridge Too Far, supra note 2, at 230-31 (placing much of the blame
for the failure of the conference on "Singapore issues"-e.g., investment and com-
petition).
4 See Chapter 2 of THE INTERNATIONAL BANK OF RECONSTRUCTON AND
DEVELOPMENT, WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECrS: TRADE REGIONALISM &
DEVELOPMENT (2005) [hereinafter WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS],
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGEP2005/Resources/
gep2005.pdf, for details on the numbers and compositions of Regional Trade
Agreements ("RTAs"). In 2003 "only three WTO members - Macau China, Mon-
golia and Chinese Taipei-were not party to a regional trade agreement." World
Trade Organization, Regionalism: Friends or Rivals?, at http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tiLe/beyle.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2005).
5 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. 1, 61 Stat. A-
11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] ("[Any advantage favour, privilege or
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or des-
tined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to
the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contract-
ing parties"). The Most Favored Nation ("MFN") principle sets up one of the
greatest conflicts in international trade -the conflict between the desire of a state
to decide for itself with whom and on what terms it will trade (and its patterns of
trade), versus the multilateral system's attempt to apply a rule of non-
discrimination for the benefit of all.
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pact on the WTO has not been subjected to a detailed examination
from an institutional perspective. 6 Such a perspective considers
how RTAs drain states' enthusiasm for multilateral trade negotia-
tions, create conflicts between RTAs and the WTO, and divert re-
sources from the WTO to the RTA process. Additionally, these in-
stitutional harms are interrelated and self-reinforcing.
Furthermore, these institutional challenges may well spell the dif-
ference between WTO stagnation and growth, when considered in
the context of the WTO's recent problems with non-tariff barriers,
services, agriculture, intellectual property rights, trade, human
rights, labor, the environment, and the many other issues now on
the WTO negotiating table. Therefore, it is imperative that the
WTO take the matter in hand and appropriately regulate the insti-
tutional impact of this massive proliferation of RTAs. After pro-
viding an institutional critique of RTAs and their relationship to
the WTO, this Article offers a Proposal to ameliorate these institu-
tional harms of RTAs.
It is no accident that this Article was first presented at a confer-
ence on WTO issues held in Israel. Israel is a country fully in-
volved in both sides of these issues - on the one hand, as a partici-
pant in many RTAs, and, on the other hand, as a fully participating
member of the WTO. 7 As an isolated country, regionally and po-
6 For the most part, discussion of RTAs and the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade ("GATT") Article XXIV ("Article XXIV") focuses on economic, for-
eign policy and political themes, and rarely on the institutional issues presented in
this Article. But see JEFFREY A. FRANKEL, REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS IN THE WORLD
ECONOMIC SYSrEM 214 (1997) (discussing, albeit briefly, some of the institutional
issues); WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PERSPECrIVES, supra note 4, at 38-39
(while the World Bank Report touches on some institutional issues, it primarily
focuses on development policy and the economic harms of RTAs, though it does
discuss some of the institutional issues covered in this Article).
7 Israel has been a member of the WTO since April 1995. WTO, Israel and the
WTO, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/countries.e/israel-e.htm (last
visited Mar. 18, 2005). Israel is or has been a member of many RTAs, with part-
ners as diverse as the United States, Canada, the European Free Trade Association
("EFTA"), the Slovak Republic, Turkey, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Slovenia, the European Community ("EC"), Mexico, and Bulgaria. See WTO, Re-
gional Trade Agreements Notified to the GATT/WTO and in Force, at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/regione/eife.xls (listing trade agree-
ments currently in effect) (last visited Mar. 18, 2005). Also, the United States-
Israel Free Trade Association ("USIFTA") was an interesting RTA, as during its
initial period of transition it was an "interim agreement," and hence should have
been subject to the special rules for "interim agreements" (though it was not).
Zakir Hafez, Weak Discipline: GATT Article XXIV and the Emerging WTO Jurispru-
dence on RTAs, 79 N.D. L. REV. 879, 886-87 (2003).
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litically, Israel must negotiate regional arrangements with as many
regions as possible. Yet, as a small country it must also rely on its
involvement in multilateral organizations to assure global trade ac-
cess, through the MFN principle, that it might not otherwise enjoy.
Additionally, Israel also exemplifies those states that enter into
RTAs for non-economic reasons -i.e., significant foreign relations
benefits related to each one of its RTAs.8 Israel is also a perfect ex-
ample of the institutional realities of involvement in both bilateral
and multilateral trade agreements. After all, Israel is a small coun-
try with correspondingly limited resources and enthusiasm to de-
vote to involvement in both the WTO and RTAs.9 Furthermore, Is-
rael cannot afford to deal with the conflicts created between RTAs
and the WTO. It is thus in the interest of countries like Israel, as
well as larger countries like the United States, to resolve the institu-
tional consequences of the proliferation of RTAs.
The next part of this Article considers why RTAs exist as well
as how they have been regulated historically. That consideration
provides the necessary backdrop against which the rest of the Arti-
cle's critiques and proposed solutions may be examined.10 This Ar-
ticle will then explore the impact of RTAs on the institution of the
WTO: the creation of harmful conflict between RTAs and the
WTO; the loss of member states' enthusiasm for the WTO; and the
reallocation of scarce resources away from the WTO. Finally, this
Article will discuss the Proposal, providing a critique of its plan for
ameliorating the institutional harms RTAs inflict on the WTO.
8 See generally David R. Karasik, Securing the Peace Dividend in the Middle East:
Amending GATT Article XXIV to Allow Sectoral Preferences in Free Trade Areas, 18
MICH J. INT'L L 527, 531-33 (1997) (discussing many noneconomic aspects of Israeli
trade agreements).
9 Despite the world's constant attention, Israel has a population of just over
six million and is "slightly smaller than New Jersey." CIA, Israel, THE WORLD
FACTBOOK (2005), at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/
is.html (last modified Feb. 10, 2005).
10 In examinations of the operation of Article XXIV, it is typical to consider
the origins of the trade system's treatment of regionalism to be relevant to consid-
eration of present issues. See, e.g., JAGDISH BHAGWATI, WRITINGS ON
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 165 (V.N. Balasubramanyam ed., 1997) [hereinafter
BHAGWATI, WRITINGS] ("It is an interesting question why Article XXIV was ac-
cepted; and it is a question that also has significance for some of the issues raised
by the Second Regionalism."); see also JAMES H. MATHIS, REGIONAL TRADE
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3. RTAs, ARTICLE XXIV AND THE WTO
RTAs include all arrangements between states concerning their
trade relations. Sometimes RTAs are called Free Trade Agree-
ments ("FTAs"), Preferential Trade Agreements, or, in some cir-
cumstances, Customs Unions.1 These agreements may be bilat-
eral, trilateral, or multilateral. Their sectoral and substantive
coverage may be significant, minimal, or illusory.12 For purposes
of this Article, the term "RTA" includes all regional trade ar-
rangements except customs unions, for customs unions are signifi-
cantly different. However, much of the critique of RTAs presented
in this Article could also apply to customs unions.13 The term
"RTA" will also be used interchangeably with the term "FTA" in
this examination of the benefits and harms of RTAs in their rela-
tionship with the WTO.
3.1. The Benefits of RTAs
The multilateral trade system has witnessed phenomenal
growth in the number, coverage, and scope of RTAs.14 While it has
been asserted that the present "fever" of activity in developing re-
11 See generally FRANKEL, supra note 6, at 12-16. It has been pointed out that
the term "Free Trade Agreement" is a misnomer- it should rather be called a
"Preferential Trade Agreement." JAGDISH BHAGWATI, A STREAM OF WINDOWS:
UNSETrLING REFLECTIONS ON TRADE, IMMIGRATION, AND DEMOCRACY 289 (1998)
[hereinafter BHAGWATI, A STREAM OF WINDOWS] (asserting that the term "Free
Trade Agreement" ("FTA") is "nothing but Orwellian newspeak"). "Free Trade
Agreement" was first officially used as a "term of art" during the development of
the International Trade Organization ("ITO"). MATHIS, supra note 10, at 42-43.
"Customs Union" is defined in GATT Article XXIV(8)(a), while "Free Trade
Agreement" is defined in GATT Article XXWV(8)(b). It should also be noted that
some have claimed that there is a substantive difference between "regional" and
"preferential" arrangements -that preferential agreements are intended to assist
in development policy. If so, the difference between the two would be one of mo-
tive rather than the structure. Raj Bhala, The Forgotten Mercy: GATT Article XXIV:
11 and Trade on the Subcontinent, 2002 N.Z. L. REV. 301, 314-316 (2002). This Article
suggests that, regardless of their titles or goals, such agreements should still fall
under this Article's Proposal, including the exceptions in the waiver provision.
12 See FRANKEL, supra note 6, at 19-20 (providing an example of an RTA that
was essentially illusory: the Economic Community of West African States
("ECOWAS")).
13 See infra Section 5 (discussing why customs unions generally are not cov-
ered by this Article's Proposal and critiques).
14 Thomas Cottier, The Challenge of Regionalism and Preferential Relations in
World Trade Law and Policy, 1 EuR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 149, 149 (1996), see also
WORLD BANK, TRADE BLOCS 1 (2000) ("The growth of regional trading blocs ... is
one of the major international relations developments of recent years.").
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. [Vol. 26:2
gional arrangements is due to globalization,15 there have been
other periods of regionalism before this present burst of activity,
16
albeit none so frenetic as the period since the birth of the WTO.'
7
There are many reasons for this growth, though in the early period
of the multilateral trade system-the post-war years-much of the
growth in RTAs was related to continuing colonial associations.'
8
Additionally, in those post-war years, RTA formation was encour-
aged as another mechanism to help increase security in Europe.19
Geopolitics aside, however, there has been no shortage of reasons,
historically and in modem times, for countries to enter into RTAs.
Understanding those reasons allows a greater understanding of the
feasibility of any proposal to regulate RTAs so as to reduce their
negative impact. Such a proposal, like the one offered in this Arti-
cle, must be able to achieve its regulatory goal, yet not detract from
the many positive reasons for utilizing RTAs. Hence the impor-
tance of first identifying the reasons that states enter into RTAs and
why the system allows RTAs to exist.
States enter into RTAs for a whole host of reasons, including
furthering economic, security, and foreign policy goals. The con-
ventional wisdom is that states enter into RTAs to secure economic
15 Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, Regional Trade Organizations: Strengthening or
Weakening Global Trade?, Remarks Before the American Society of International
Law (Apr. 7, 1994), in 88 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 309, 310 (1994).
16 See BHAGWATI, WRITINGS, supra note 10, at 167-172 (discussing the regional-
isms of the 1960s and 1980s).
17 More than half of all RTAs have been negotiated in the last ten years.
WTO, Regional Trade Agreements, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e
/region-e/region-e.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2005). It has also been suggested that
perhaps a major reason for so many countries, especially developing countries,
taking part in RTAs is the abandonment of the trade policy of "import substitu-
tion" in the same period. FRANKEL, supra note 6, at 7-10; see also Amy Porges, Re-
gional Trade Organizations: Strengthening or Weakening Global Trade?, Remarks Be-
fore the American Society of International Law (Apr. 7, 1994), in 88 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PRoc. 312, 312 (1994) (arguing that developing countries are gaining a
benefit from RTAs that they were not getting with import substitution policies);
WORLD BANK, TRADE BLOCS, supra note 14, at 2 (providing that import substitution
was the basis for the formation of trading blocs in the 1960s and 1970s but that re-
cently regional agreements are more outward looking).
18 See Kym Anderson & Hege Norheim, History, Geography and Regional Eco-
nomic Integration, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 19,
39-41 (Kym Anderson & Richard Blackhurst eds., 1993) (describing British and
French RTAs with their former colonies).
19 See MATHIS, supra note 10, at 28 (reporting Roosevelt's declaration that en-
tering into an RTA after World War II would avoid "replay of the Versailles
Treaty" between "potential victors and the vanquished").
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or welfare gains from exclusive access to the other RTA states'
markets. 20 States may also join RTAs to ensure continued access to
a market already covered by an RTA. For example, the purpose of
Canada's involvement in the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment ("NAFTA") was, in part, to ensure it retained the access to
the U.S. market that it had obtained from a previous RTA - the
Canada-U.S. FTA ("CUSFTA").21 Similarly, when all other coun-
tries are perceived to be entering into such arrangements, a coun-
try will not want to be left behind.22 This is called "domino region-
alism."23 In this way, involvement in RTAs ensures that a state is
not "taken advantage of" through multilateralism.24 All these rea-
sons speak to the underlying idea that a state will seek to establish
positive preferences from other countries for the state's industries
and interests - sometimes non-economic interests.
25
20 This Article will not consider the relative pros and cons of the various dif-
ferent types of RTAs-be they bilateral, trilateral, etc. For a serious economic
analysis of why countries would choose one form over another, see generally,
BETH V. YARBROUGH & ROBERT M. YARBROUGH, COOPERATION AND GOVERNANCE IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE STRATEGIC ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH 111-33 (1992).
This Article will not delve into the details of the primary possible economic bene-
fits of regional integration -"compefition and scale" or the "trade and location."
For more information, see WORLD BANK, TRADE BLOCS, supra note 14, at 29-61. Suf-
fice to say that those benefits can be substantial, but that they rely upon wise pol-
icy choices, as well as the type of integration and the parties involved. Id. at 61.
21 Canada-United States Free-Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27
I.L.M. 281; see also FREDERICK M. ABBOTT, LAW AND POLICY OF REGIONAL
INTEGRATION: THE NAFTA AND WESTERN HEMISPHERIC INTEGRATION IN THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION SYSTEM 20 (1995) (providing that Canada negotiated during
the NAFTA negotiations to keep open future negotiations with other nations).
22 See BHAGWATI, WRITINGS, supra note 10, at 172 (explaining that the Euro-
pean Union ("EU") and the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
("CUSFTA") have created a sense that "others must follow suit"). Consider, also,
the recent actions of Japan in negotiating its first RTA, with Singapore, in 2002,
and its ongoing negotiations with Mexico, Republic of Korea, Thailand, Malaysia,
and the Philippines. WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4,
at 137.
23 WORLD BANK, TRADE BLOCS, supra note 14, at 96; see also Richard E. Baldwin,
A Domino Theory of Regionalism, in EXPANDING MEMBERSHIP OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION 25, 27-31 (Richard Baldwin et al. eds., 1995) (arguing that this helps to ex-
plain the Mexican desire for an agreement with the United States and Canada fol-
lowing the CUSFTA, and the desire by the Scandinavian countries to join the
European Community ("EC")).
24 BHAGWATI, WRITINGS, supra note 10, at 170.
25 See MATHIS, supra note 10, at 127 (quoting Runato Ruggiero: "'[T]hese ini-
tiatives are less about advancing regional economic efficiency or cooperation...
and more about securing regional preferences, even regional spheres of influence,
in a world marked by growing competition for markets, for investment and for
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In addition to providing individual states with economic and
welfare benefits, RTAs also provide benefits for individual states
and the global economy through their interaction with the multi-
lateral system and trade policy as a whole.26 As an initial matter,
regionalism may serve as an inducement for the development of
multilateralism. 27 The United States' response to European region-
alism was initially to push ever harder for multilateral trade devel-
opment-with some success. That policy led to some of the more
important rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") - the Dillon, Kennedy, and Tokyo Rounds.28 The threat
of regionalism, and the trade diversion that goes with it, may thus
encourage the conclusion and acceptance of multilateral agree-
ments.29
Regional arrangements can also increase the bargaining power
of an RTA's constituent members within multilateral arrange-
ments.30 Additionally, with the recent increase in regionalism due
to globalization, combined with the opening of economies in the
post-tariff era, economic actors suddenly have become aware of
Non-Tariff Barriers ("NTBs") and the need to deal with them.
technology.'") (alteration in original).
26 See generally Frederick M. Abbott, The North American Integration Regime and
its Implications for the World Trading System, in THE EU, THE WTO, AND THE NAFTA
169, 177-84 U.H.H. Weiler ed., 2000) (examining NAFTA's affects on the world
trading system). Though perhaps this success has more to do with the economies
of the member states than with the regional agreements themselves.
27 See BHAGWATI, WRITINGS, supra note 10, at 170 (discussing views that re-
gionalism can supplement or even support multilaterism); see, e.g., BHAGWATI, A
STREAM OF WINDOWS, supra note 11, at 307 (arguing that CUSFTA served "to jump-
start" the GATT in the mid-1980s).
28 FRANKEL, supra note 6, at 5. The Dillon Round effected $4.9 billion in trade,
the Kennedy Round $40 billion, and the Tokyo Round $155 billion. JOHN H.
JACKSON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXTS
314 (3d ed. 1995). But see WORLD BANK, TRADE BLOCS, supra note 14, at 102 (argu-
ing that this exclusion really only impacted the timing as the negotiations would
have happened anyway). At one point, it might have been argued that RTAs
could promote multilateral trade development through those countries not parties
to RTAs pushing extra hard for multilateral development, so as to reduce their
comparative disadvantage, or to erode the benefits of those RTAs to RTA mem-
bers. It has been argued that this fear of regionalism was a contributing factor in
pushing the EU and the United States to a final agreement of disputed issues dur-
ing the Uruguay Round. However, the evidence is mixed and as such it is unclear
whether RTAs encouraged multilateral developments.
29 BHAGWATI, WRITINGS, supra note 10, at 170.
30 See WORLD BANK, TRADE BLOCS, supra note 14, at 17-21 (noting that while
often sought through such arrangements, success in increasing bargaining power
is less common).
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Such actors have found it easiest to deal with these barriers
through the employment of RTAs.31 RTAs may also create "lock-
in" effects. Regional agreements may lock in economic reforms
and give credibility to those reforms - internally and externally.
32
RTAs may also serve as "laboratories" by trying out new ap-
proaches that can later be applied in the multilateral arena.33 For
example, NAFTA's investor protection provisions may serve as a
model in future multilateral trade negotiations. 34 It has, however,
been suggested that this benefit, like so many, can cut both ways;
the European Union's ("EU") Common Agricultural Policy
("CAP") is a prime example of a novel policy with negative im-
pacts on world trade policy; certainly not a policy that should be
mirrored in the future.35 Another trade benefit of RTAs is that they
are thought to be more likely to tackle hard issues, as resolving is-
sues between two parties is much easier than within the multilat-
eral framework. Examples include NAFTA's investor protection
provisions in Chapter 11, the EU treatment of labor issues, and the
treatment of information technology products between Brazil and
the rest of the MERCOSUR.36
Some studies, however, suggest that those economic, welfare,
31 Braga, supra note 15, at 310.
32 See WORLD BANK, TRADE BLOCS, supra note 14, at 22-26 (examining RTAs as
lock-in mechanisms). It has also been noted that regional arrangements are un-
necessary for this goal in light of the existence of the WTO. Id. at 23.
33 WORLD BANK, TRADE BLOCS, supra note 14, at 104-05. For a discussion of
the new issues tackled by RTAs, see generally WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 97-123.
34 See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, ch. 11, 32 I.L.M.
289, 639-49 [hereinafter NAFTA] (regulating investment for NAFTA members).
35 For information on the EU's Common Agricultural Policy ("CAP"), see
European Commission, Agriculture, at http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/
en/s04000.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2005).
36 See generally NAFTA, supra note 34; European Commission, Free Movement
of Workers, at http:/ / europa.eu.int/ scadplus/ leg/ en/ s2305.htm (last visited Apr.
3, 2005) (discussing worker migration); WORLD BANK, TRADE BLOCS, supra note 14,
at 105 ("the EU has addressed a wide range of deep integration issues). Mercosur
is the "Treaty Establishing a Common Market between the Argentine Republic,
the Federal Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic
of Uruguay" and was created in 1991 by the Treaty of Ascunsion, with the goal of
creating a common market of the participating countries. See M~rcosur (discussing
the Mercosur report), at http://www.mercosur.org.uy/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2005);
see also WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PERSPECrIVES, supra note 4, at Chapter 5;
European Commission, The EU's relations with Mercosur, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/externalrelations/mercosur/intro/ (last visited
Apr. 3, 2005).
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and trade gains are far from assured, if, in fact, they exist at all.37
Accordingly, many consider that it is the non-economic benefits
that serve as the primary rationale for RTAs.38 In particular, for-
eign policy and national security continue to be significant reasons
for entering into RTAs.39 Indeed, as mentioned above, trade
agreements have played a role in the Middle East peace process.
40
RTAs can also be employed to realign external relations, as in the
cases of Turkey with Europe, and Mexico with North America.
41
RTAs may also serve as a foreign policy reward for allies. For ex-
ample, entering into an RTA with an economic power can serve to
reward countries and convince them to adopt more market-
oriented domestic policies.42 RTAs may even be thought to assist
in domestic political affairs.43 The World Bank recently argued that
37 See, e.g., WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at
Chapter 3 (examining such ideas); ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, REGIONALISM,
MULTILATERALISM, AND DEEPER INTEGRATION 95 (1996) (discussing implications of
regionalism); BHAGWATI, WRITINGS, supra note 10, at 182 (questioning popular as-
sertions about regionalism). There has also been criticism of the assertions that
RTAs provide quicker results, that they are more efficient, and that their results
are more certain. See id. at 187 (concluding that regionalism's revival in the 1980s
and 90s is "unfortunate").
38 See, e.g., WORLD BANK, TRADE BLOcS, supra note 14, at Ch. 2 (examining the
non-economic political benefits of RTAs); MATHIS, supra note 10, at 127 (focusing
on the concept of regional spheres of influence).
39 See WORLD BANK, TRADE BLOCS, supra note 14, at 12-17 (noting that some-
times regional agreements may increase tension between parties).
40 See generally, Karasik, supra note 8, at 528 ("a new era of increasing eco-
nomic cooperation"). The United States' pursuit of RTAs in the Middle East is
also associated with the current war on terror. See Alvin Hilaire & Yongzheng
Yang, The United States and the New Regionalism/Bilateralism, 38 J. WORLD TRADE
603, 604 (2004) (describing the present extensive RTA efforts by the United States
in the Middle East). The United States-Jordan FTA was a reward for its peace
agreement with Israel. Mohammad Nsour, Fundamental Facets of the United States-
Jordan Free Trade Agreement: E-Commerce, Dispute Resolution, and Beyond, 27
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 742, 742 (2004).
41 BHAGWATI, WRITINGS, supra note 10, at 171.
42 Thelma Askey, Regional Trade Organizations: Strengthening or Weakening
Global Trade?, Remarks Before the American Society of International Law (Apr. 7,
1994), in 88 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROc. 309, 319 (1994).
43 For example, one of the goals of the United States in entering into NAFTA
was to help stem the tide of illegal Mexican immigrants to the United States.
ABBOTr, supra note 21, at 17; see also Karasik, supra note 8, at 534-35 (discussing fac-
tors that explain why nations form RTAs); WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC
PERSPECrIVES, supra note 4, at 111-115 (discussing EU and other RTA considera-
tions of the movement of people). There is even an argument that some RTAs
were entered into, at least in part, to ensure continued access to energy resources.
See Melaku Geboye Desta, The Organization of Oil Exporting Countries, the World
[Vol. 26:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol26/iss2/2
2005] REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS V. THE WTO 279
"[m]any of the arguments for membership in a regional agreement
are political." 44 But the reality is, of course, more complex. RTAs
are formed for substantially the same reasons they have always
been formed - a mixture of many reasons: political, economic, and
security all included. Nonetheless, despite such varied rationales
for RTAs, this Article's Proposal to reform the regulation of RTAs
manages to confront the RTAs' institutional concerns, while leav-
ing these rationales unharmed.
3.2. The Regulation of RTAs
Given the many benefits of RTAs, it is no surprise that RTAs
existed long before the birth of the modem international trade re-
gime in 1947.45 The concern about those RTAs also has a long his-
tory.46 Much of that early anxiety was related to the fact that RTAs
are inherently discriminatory -with all the negative consequences
associated with discrimination. Nonetheless, RTAs had long en-
joyed exemption from MFN obligations in bilateral trade agree-
ments.47 Despite this traditional acceptance of RTAs, the period
between the two world wars cast RTAs in a particularly negative
light as they were considered to be a contributing cause of the de-
scent back into war.48 Indeed, even before work began on the
Trade Organization, and Regional Trade Agreements, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 523, 539
(2003) (pointing to energy chapters in such trade agreements as NAFTA, the Free
Trade Area of the Americas ("FTAA"), European Community Treaty, and the
European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC")).
44 WORLD BANK, TRADE BLOCS, supra note 14, at 6. But see ABBOTt, supra note
21, at 17-18 (arguing that America's and Mexico's primary goal in entering into
NAFTA was economic). However, economics does not provide as much support
for the entry into many of the non-territorially contiguous RTAs, such as United
States-Israel. Politics explains that agreement much better than economics. See
BHAGWATI, WRITINGS, supra note 10, at 180 (noting that politics seems to drive such
decisions).
45 In 1947, the GATT was born.
46 See, e.g., MATHIS, supra note 10, at 37 (quoting George Washington's fare-
well speech: "to hold an equal and impartial hand, neither seeking nor granting
exclusive favors or preferences").
47 Interestingly, the exemptions were sometimes not explicit, but by custom.
MATHIS, supra note 10, at 31; see JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF
GATT 576 (1969) (hereinafter JACKSON (1969)) (citing J. VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNION
ISSUE 6-12 (1950)).
48 MATHIS, supra note 10, at 14-17. Consequently, that interwar period formed
the backdrop against which the post-war world economic regime would be set:
the Bretton Woods institutions, including the later negotiated Havana Charter,
and its GATT substitute. FRANKEL, supra note 6, at 2-3. The Bretton Woods insti-
tutions initially included the World Bank and the IMF. JACKSON (1969), supra note
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doomed International Trade Organization ("ITO"), elimination of
the fragmented world economy of the interwar years, character-
ized by many preferential and regional systems, was one of the
main economic goals for the post-war period.49 The United States,
in particular, was intent on extension of the MFN principle as one
device to ensure that the interwar period's harmful policies would
not be replicated. 50 It has been argued that the "purpose of the en-
tire ITO exercise from the U.S. view was to terminate the use of
preferences in international trade... ."51 However, the British and
other colonial interests stood solidly in the way, and so the United
States was forced to compromise and agree to some type of excep-
tion for preferential regimes.5
2
The question was then what forms of preferential and regional
arrangements should enjoy exemption from MFN. The original
U.S. proposal allowed only for a customs union exemption to the
MFN principle.5 3 But during the negotiation of the ITO, a MFN ex-
47, at 40. The ITO, while considered, was postponed for later detailed considera-
tion.
49 See Atlantic Joint Declaration, Aug. 14, 1941, available at http://
www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/atlantic.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2005)
("The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr.
Churchill... deem it right to make known certain common principles in the na-
tional policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a
better future for the world.... [T]hey will endeavor, with due respect for their ex-
isting obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or
vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the
world which are needed for their economic prosperity ... .
50 Id.
51 MATHIS, supra note 10, at 42. The United States' position was that one of its
primary goals in the ITO negotiation was the elimination of preferential arrange-
ments. JACKSON (1969), supra note 47, at 576.
52 See Hafez, supra note 7, at 881-82 (discussing the British position on their
colonial preference system, that, in part, the preference system would allow the
maintenance of imperial connections even as their former colonies broke free);
MATHIS, supra note 10, at 42-43 (suggesting that the United States most likely ac-
quiesced to the compromise, though the records are insufficient to clearly deter-
mine the final United States position during the final stages of the negotiations).
It should be noted that the United States position on customs unions was less
strict-both for economic reasons (more trade creating than trade diverting) and
for political reasons (the need for economic cooperation in post-war Europe).
MATHIS, supra note 10, at 32. Indeed, the failure to have those non-customs union
colonial preferences removed played a significant role in the Administration and
Congressional failure to support the creation of the ITO. MATHIS, supra note 10, at
18, 23.
53 See MATHIs, supra note 10, at 34-35 (referencing draft proposals); JACKSON
(1969), supra note 47, at 577 ("The original United States draft included clauses
excepting such arrangements from Most-Favored-Nation and other obligations.").
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ception for non-customs union RTAs was considered by the nego-
tiators.5 4 The United States was willing to permit that additional
exception, as it erroneously believed that serious FTA technical dif-
ficulties would quickly lead participants to embrace customs un-
ions instead.55 Overall, the United States was not supportive of ex-
ceptions to the MFN principle. But the willingness of the
negotiators, including the United States, to accept RTAs in that pe-
riod may have been tied to the unusual circumstances of that era:
the post-war, post-colonial period in which the world found itself.
When the ITO failed to garner the necessary international sup-
port to come into existence, the parties turned to an interim ar-
rangement, GATT.56 The final compromise concerning those RTAs
in GATT was embodied in Article XXJV.57 Because the traditional
critique of RTAs focused on trade diversion, Article XXIV excepted
%4 See JACKSON (1969), supra note 47, at 577 (describing the drafting process).
Another reason for the general support of an exception to MFN for RTAs was to
allow developing countries the option to adopt regional agreements among them-
selves. MATHis, supra note 10, at 31. Furthermore, allowing such RTAs would ac-
commodate developing countries which would not otherwise be able to benefit
from GATT's grandfather clause, as the developing countries had not yet devel-
oped their barriers. See also, Porges, supra note 17, at 313 (discussing the impact of
RTAs); MATHIS, supra note 10, at 7 (commenting on regionalism in the context of
dispute resolution). Additionally, developing countries thought that FTAs would
be easier to implement than customs unions. Id.
55 See Hafez, supra note 7, at 883-884 (noting the United States' view on
FTAs). The rules of origin issue is the biggest problem. Id., at 887-88 (noting that
the costs of implementation are high).
56 Nonetheless, the negotiation of the RTA exception within the ITO is crucial
background for understanding the eventual GATT resolution and to any consid-
erations of amending the present relationship. For example, an early proposal al-
lowing the RTA exception to the MFN called for a two-thirds vote to allow ex-
emptions for preferential arrangements. MATHIS, supra note 10, at 34.
Additionally, there was consideration of a time limit, a sort of "infant industry"
exemption, and an allowance for contiguous territories. Id. at 35.
57 Despite the fact that the regulation of RTAs is placed in the second half of
GATT, Article XXlV, this should not be read to mean that the regulation of RTAs
was not a central, perhaps one of the central, issues of the original GATT and the
present-day WTO. Article XXIV's position reflects early conceptions about the
issue of regionalism-as an "administrative problem of defining the territorial
scope of the agreement and providing for the special exceptions of neighboring
countries." JACKSON (1969), supra note 47, at 575 n.1. It was later proposed in the
drafting stage of GATT to change Article XXIV's location within GATF, though
this was never implemented. Id. With respect to MFN, the regulation of preferen-
tial trading regimes was and is a primary issue. MATHIS, supra note 10, at 24. In-
deed, Jackson's early work, suggests that more had then been written on Article
XX1V than any other aspect of GATT. JACKSON (1969), supra note 47, at 576.
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those RTAs that concentrated on trade creation,5 8 minimized trade
diversion,5 9 and covered substantially all trade between the par-
ties.60 GATT also grandfathered in existing preference schemes:
the British Imperial preferences, the BENELUX preferences, Leba-
non-Syrian preferences with Palestine and Transjordan, and the
French Union preferences. 61 Despite these exceptions, it was con-
templated that Article XXIV would be the primary control on
RTAs. Unfortunately, the power of Article XXIV was eroded early
on as a consequence of one of the central weaknesses of the origi-
nal GATT-the requirement of consensus for any action to be
taken against any violators. This led to the absurd notion that the
violating country could itself just veto any condemnation of its
RTA violative behavior. 62 Thus, no RTAs were condemned, while
few received approval.6 3 Consequently, while there were many
GATT working parties that considered the various RTAs, only one
RTA was ever able to be certified as GATT compliant by the work-
ing groups.64 The position of RTAs within the multilateral system
was essentially unchecked by the time the GATT was replaced by
the WTO.
58 See JACKSON (1969), supra note 47, at 601 (discussing one view of paragraph
4 of GATT as establishing a "'trade creating' versus 'trade diverting' dichotomy").
59 See MATHIS, supra note 10, at 2-3 (noting that the drafting record establishes
an approach to regional trade agreements designed to prevent regional members
from selecting "diverting preferences").
60 See MATHIS, supra note 10, at 45 (discussing the view that free trade would
be supported as an exception).
61 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agree-
ment], THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 6; see also JACKSON (1969), supra note 47, at 264-65 (describing
permissible historical preferences).
62 See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES,
MATERIALS AND TExTS 263 (4th ed. 2002) ("Traditionally, decisions in the Council
were made by consensus, which meant that any party - including the losing
party -could prevent the Council from adopting a panel report."). Of course, this
reflected GATT's mediation orientation to the resolution of disputes compared to
the WTO's binding rule adjudication orientation. Id. at 252. The GATT's orienta-
tion perhaps better reflected then-prevailing concepts of state-to-state dispute
resolution than are exhibited in today's more litigious environment.
63 Approval also required consensus, and GATT signatories that were not a
part of the RTA at issue would have been unwilling to lose future claims by agree-
ing that an RTA was GATT-compliant. Porges, supra note 17, at 313; see
YARBROUGH & YARBROUGH, supra note 20, at 107-10 (providing examples of eco-
nomic situations where RTAs would be desirable).
64 See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PERSPECIVEs, supra note 4, at 140 (not-
ing that only the Czech-Slovak Customs Union RTA has been certified).
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During the Uruguay Round some of these problems were ad-
dressed. The issues raised in the GATT RTA working parties were
considered in the Uruguay Round's reform of Article XXIV, result-
ing in the "Understanding on Article XXIV" ("the Understand-
ing"). 65 The Understanding, among other things, provides that the
review process of Article XXIV does not insulate RTAs from the
WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU"); includes spe-
cific details of how RTAs must measure trade so as to be in com-
pliance with Article XXIV; provides a timetable during which new
emerging RTAs must be phased into operation; and creates a
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements ("CRTA") to engage in
oversight of RTAs and their relationship with the WTO.66 The Un-
derstanding, however, is essentially technical and has not really al-
tered the relationship of RTAs to the multilateral trading system.
67
The Understanding and the CRTA examination report process, not
surprisingly, have proven unable to ensure RTA compliance with
Article XXIV.68 Indeed, today few RTAs are Article XXIV-
65 See generally Porges, supra note 17, at 313 (detailing the various provisions
addressed by the Uruguay Round).
66 See Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A [hereinafter Understanding on
Art. XXIV], 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) THE LEGAL TExTs: THE RESuLTS
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 31 (implementing
changes to Article XXIV of GAT 1994); see also WTO, WORK OF THE COMMrrrEE ON
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS ("CRTA") [hereinafter CRTA WEBSITE], ("[CRTAs]
two principal duties are to examine individual regional agreements; and to con-
sider [their] systemic implications. ) at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop.e/region-e/regcom...e.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2005).
67 ABBOTr, supra note 21, at 37. The 1994 GATT retains a historical tolerance
for RIA formation. Id.
68 See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PERSPECTVES, supra note 4, at 141 (dis-
cussing the difficulty of RTA examination). For a discussion of the operation of
the CRTA in general, see MATHLs, supra note 10, at 227-258. It should be noted,
however, that Article XXIV compliance may improve slightly, though not suffi-
ciently, as a result of the Understanding's specific discussion of RTAs' relation-
ship to the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding. The Dispute Settlement
Body ("DSB") is starting to have an impact on Article XXIV jurisprudence. See,
e.g., WTO Appellate Body, Report on Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile
and Clothing Products, 58, WT/DS34/AB/R (Oct. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Turkey
Case] (appealing panel finding disallowing restrictions inconsistent with GATT
1994), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtoab/turkey-
textiles(ab).pdf. Perhaps of significance is that the DSB can address issues unre-
solved by the WTO members. An example is that it was long considered an issue
as to whether Article XXIV merely provided an exception to Article I (MFN)- the
DSB has suggested that is not the case. Id.
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compliant, while there are many that are not even notified to the
WTO.69 Most recently, WTO negotiations are attempting to exam-
ine the RTA rules yet again. That effort is largely focused on
transparency 70 and on some substantive issues. 71 It is unclear,
however, just how successful these negotiations will be, though on
their own it appears unlikely that they would have an impact on
the institutional concerns raised in this Article. Accordingly, just
as GATT's Article XXIV was much abused by GATT signatories,
we now see the same pattern within the WTO.72
4. AN INSTITUTIONAL CRITIQUE OF RTAs - CONFLICT CREATION,
RESOURCE DIVERSION, AND DIMINISHING STATE VVTO ENTHUSIASM
As a mechanism to control RTAs, Article XXV has proven
weak and irrelevant over the decades, despite recent reform.73 In
part, this is because Article XXWV only focuses on the economic as-
pects of RTAs.74 Certainly, the usual critique of RTAs concerns
69 See Hafez, supra note 7, at 916-17 (describing the current RTA examination
process as being ineffective); WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PERSPECTrIVES, supra
note 4, at 29-30 (noting that the notification requirement has "enjoyed only incon-
sistent compliance").
70 This is likely to include a greater role for the WTO Secretariat and greater
detail required in the notification process. WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 142-43.
71 While very early on in this process these issues are likely to include greater
specification of product coverage requirements and to broaden the understanding
of the concept that RTAs do not result in greater protectionism to include Non-
Tariff Barrier ("NTB") issues, such as anti-dumping policies. See id. (listing issues
under consideration); see also CRTA WEBSTE, supra note 66 (describing the work of
the CRTA).
72 See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PERSPECrIVES, supra note 4, at 141 (dis-
cussing RTAs and WTO disciplines); MATHIS, supra note 10, at 122-23 (discussing
the difficulty the WTO encounters interpreting Article XXIV).
73 Perhaps it was because prior to the creation of an international trade or-
ganization with real power, as opposed to GATT's diplomacy-oriented approach
to international trade, there was not the same conflict we see today. Similarly,
prior to NAFTA and the strengthening of the EU in the first half of the 1990s,
RTAs were simply not the force they are today. See Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the
Barrier Between Regionalism and Multilateralism, 42 HARV INT'L L.J. 419, 428 (2001)
("[A] strong economic, rather than political, motivation for the formation of an
RTA is key to its success.").
74 For the requirements of Article XXIV are at first definitional, and then are
focused on the trade distorting effects -too great a trade distorting effect and the
RTA could, theoretically, be denied the exception. GAIT, art. XXIV. As noted
earlier, this Article will not retread the economic critique, the most common cri-
tique of Article XXIV and of RTAs in general, though it has been suggested that an
economic critique of RTAs will, however, at the end of the day be inconclusive.
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their economic impact on the world trade system.75 Almost all the
literature critiquing RTAs' relationships with the world trade sys-
tem have focused on economic issues, despite the fact that the eco-
nomic impact of RTAs on the multilateral trade system is far from
clear. 76 Nonetheless, consistent with these critiques, the response
of the multilateral system to the problem of RTAs, first through the
GATT and now through the WTO, has been economic. This re-
sponse has been an attempt to control RTA formation so as to
minimize the economic harm while maximizing the economic
benefit.77 As a result, RTAs could well be formed "willy-nilly" so
See Bhala, supra note 11, at 305 (noting that "it depends" is probably the truest an-
swer as to whether RTAs are beneficial); see also JACKSON (1969), supra note 47, at
621 (stating that economists are uncertain about regional arrangements such as
GATT); FRANKEL, supra note 6, at 208 ("[Firom the standpoint of static economic
welfare, trade economists are in fact ambivalent about the desirability of FTAs...
75 The many sources cited in this Article are a testament to this proposition -
for only in small part, if at all, do they discuss noneconomic critiques of RTAs,
and rarely, if ever, the institutional aspects of the relationship between RTAs and
the multilateral system. Other noneconomic, yet not institutional criticisms of
RTAs, include the idea that preferential systems like RTAs are just disguised im-
perialism- the idea being that RTAs tie smaller or weaker countries to bigger or
more powerful ones, forcing the weaker or smaller state to orient its trade to the
other even as the other state is free to do what it wants. The bigger or more pow-
erful state can do this because its trade with the smaller is really of no great im-
pact on its trade flows and structures. See LAWRENCE, supra note 37, at 3 ("Major
regional arrangements could be dominated by considerations of market power...
."); MATHIS, supra note 10, at 20 (describing international trade preferences as an
expression of modem imperialism). Another noneconomic critique of RTAs is
that engagement in an RTA shows favoritism-that it shows "who your friends
are" -to the detriment of cordial relations with other non-RTA countries. See
Charles Roh, Regional Trade Organizations: Strengthening or Weakening Global Trade,
Remarks Before the American Society of International Law (Apr. 7, 1994), in 88
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 309, 309 (1994) (stating that one of the reasons the United
States has over the years refrained from free trade agreements was to avoid hav-
ing to "look as though we were choosing from among our best friends"). Indeed,
it was suggested that this reason, avoidance of a "slap in the face" to non-RTA al-
lies, was one of the reasons the United States avoided RTAs until relatively re-
cently. For other critiques of RTAs, see Cho, Breaking the Barrier, supra note 73, at
430.
76 See discussion supra note 75; see also Cottier, supra note 14, at 154 (discuss-
ing the little impact of RTAs on trade flows due to the already low tariff levels in
existence, the fact that agriculture is rarely covered, and the significant issue of
NTBs and other trade distorting government actions (and that these issues are not
covered well in RTAs, but rather at the multilateral level, and that absent a move
to federalism there is a limit on what regional arrangements can accomplish)).
77 See, e.g., WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PERSPIECIrVES, supra note 4, at 111-
115 (presenting a collection of suggested reforms to Article XXIV that are all eco-
nomic-based proposals).
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long as the economic criteria are addressed. However, this focus
on economic solutions to RTAs, embodied in Article XXIV and its
jurisprudence, fails to consider the noneconomic harms of RTAs,
and, in particular, the institutional impact of RTAs on the WTO.
Furthermore, while Article XXIV's economic focus may have
been appropriate in the post-war economic and political environ-
ment, it is far from clear that this focus works today.78 The trade
environment today is radically different from that when the GATT
and its Article XXIV came into being in 1947. Today, the general
tariff levels are a bare fraction of what they were fifty years ago.79
NTBs and other trade-related issues such as intellectual property,
investment measures, and services, are being tackled, and there is a
concerted effort to improve members' transparency. 80 Further-
more, reflecting its formal institutional character, the new WTO
employs a dispute settlement body ("DSB") with serious powers to
authorize state retaliation for violations of WTO agreements. Yet,
even as new sectors and issues are addressed by the WTO, RTAs
remain largely unregulated by the weak Article XXIV. Further-
more, the one modernization to the regulation of RTAs, the Under-
standing, falls short of any real practical effort to control RTAs. It
especially fails to reign in the growing institutional impact of RTAs
on the WTO.
Additionally, certain trends of the WTO and international insti-
tutions suggest that the WTO's institutional health is more fragile
than many would believe, and that the unprotected threat from the
RTAs could strike the fatal blow.81 This is not to say that the WTO
78 Indeed, a question is raised whether the exception permitting RTAs was
really suitable to a multilateral trade institution. With the birth of the FTA
movement in the 1980s, starting with the IUSFTA and then the CUSFTA, a legiti-
mate question may be whether Article XXIV responded sufficiently to RTAs so as
to stave off the RTA's role in the institutional demise of GATT. That question in-
evitably leads to the present issue of whether the hardier WTO is not now feeling
that pressure and whether it will survive the conflict.
79 World tariff rates have dropped from an average of 40% to below 5%.
WORLD BANK, TRADE BLocs, supra note 14, at 101.
80 See WTO Ministerial Declaration, Doha WTO Ministerial Conference, 4th
sess., WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 14, 2001), (affirming current commitment to
process of reform and liberalization) available at http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto-e/minist e/min0le /mindecle.htm.
81 Furthermore, in a post-cold war era, the modem economic superpowers
(Japan, EU, United States, and perhaps China) are not under pressure to remain
united, as they were when facing communism or the common enemy of the Soviet
Union. Thus, they may be less committed to multilateralism and may seek their
own regional goals at the expense of multilateralism. MATHIS, supra note 10, at
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will disappear, so much as it would become irrelevant.8 2 Large or-
ganizations like the WTO that, for the most part, run on consensus
or that provide even the smallest member with equal voting pow-
ers (thereby allowing the formation of blocs to defeat change) are
particularly vulnerable.8 3 Thus, the WTO's institutional vulnerabil-
ity demands that institutional threats be addressed. 84 The first step
in addressing this issue is to identify and explore the contours of
the specific institutional threats.
4.1. Conflict Creation
Conflicts occur whenever different legal systems or different
rules apply concurrently to an issue. Indeed, the concept of con-
flicts of laws is sufficiently serious and widespread that it is con-
sidered a separate and distinct part of legal analysis -whether as
private international law or, as it is called in the United States, con-
flicts of laws. Considering RTAs and the WTO to be separate sys-
tems and jurisdictions, 85 it should come as no surprise that there
133-34.
82 Such irrelevancy may be akin to that which some have claimed is the case
now with the UN General Assembly. While not commenting on his substantive
conclusion, President George W. Bush's speech to the General Assembly before
the recent Iraq War raised it as a legitimate topic of conversation. See President
George W. Bush, Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 12,
2002) ("Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be ir-
relevant?"), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/
20020912-1.html.
83 See generally WTO Agreement, supra note 61, art. IX, X (stating that deci-
sionmaking in the WTO shall be by consensus, that all member nations shall have
an equal vote, and that each member state shall have the ability to propose an
amendment).
84 Perhaps, in part, the failure of Article XXIV to respond to an institutional
threat is related to the fact that Article XXIV was originally a part of GATr- an
agreement, not an institution. Article XXIV was created and grew out of the pe-
riod in which there was no clear world trade institution. Of course, even though
GATI was not an institution, by its end it shared many of the properties and
characteristics of an institution. Still, the early RTAs were formed often, with in-
stitutional structure, when the overarching body to regulate them had no official
institutional frame. This changed with the creation of the WTO-an institution.
Given the modem institutional structure of the WTO, perhaps this Article's ex-
amination of an institutional challenge is more timely than such an examination
would have been in the GATT period before the WTO. Indeed, perhaps Article
XXIV, while appropriate for GATT, fails to provide all that is necessary in the era
of proliferating trade institutions- regional and multilateral.
85 Perhaps one avenue would be to consider the RTA systems sub-federal
systems (states or provinces) and the WTO system a federal system, as opposed to
considering them as unrelated and distinct legal systems. In which case, resort to
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would be the potential for conflict between them.86 Such conflicts,
while beneficial in small doses,87 may otherwise be quite destruc-
tive. For example, conflict may cause increased tension between
parties or within the system as a whole. Sometimes the conflict
may even erupt into a full blown "trade war." Unfortunately,
these trade wars can be quite harmful to WTO development by, for
example, impeding multilateral negotiations. More specifically,
the conflicts between the WTO and RTAs appear in different con-
texts: during RTA creation; through the application of the RTA's
substantive provisions; during the management of the RTA; as a
result of the development of RTA jurisprudence; and during the
RTA dispute settlement procedures. This section will survey many
of these conflicts and their associated harms.
Perhaps the most obvious conflict caused by RTAs is also the
one that strikes the greatest threat to the WTO: rampant RTA fail-
ure to satisfy Article XXIV and its consequent potential to under-
mine the very legitimacy of the WTO. Despite the fact that WTO
members can only enter into RTAs pursuant to WTO rules, few
RTAs appear to be consistent with the WTO's requirements in Ar-
ticle XXIV.88 Although RTAs may be treated more seriously by the
the jurisprudence of domestic constitutional systems may be enlightening and as-
sist in the examination of the relationship between RTAs and the WTO. It has also
been suggested that resolution of the "RTA problem" could come from RTAs and
the WTO learning to co-exist, and that the status of RTAs as exceptions to the
WTO, and as therefore conceptually inferior to the WTO, should be abandoned.
See Cho, Breaking the Barrier, supra note 73, at 452-53 (proposing that the WTO and
the RTAs be understood as operating in a non-hierarchical "global trading com-
munity"). But that assumes that they can safely exist together as equals. Such an
assumption is far from obviously true. Indeed, just as the United States had to
force the internal states to be subservient to the U.S. Constitution and federal au-
thority, so too RTAs may need to be reined in by the WTO, under whose auspices
they owe their existence. Perhaps the WTO, through a proposal such as the one
suggested here, might reinforce the fact that RTAs cannot exist as equals with the
WTO, but should rather behave as participants within the WTO process, whose
goals and activities must not harm the WTO. Achieving that goal, whether
through the Proposal or otherwise, would go a long way to preserving the future
for the WTO.
86 Of course, RTAs may also contribute to conflict elimination -many believe
that countries that trade with each other do not fight with each other-but the
benefit of the bilateral trade relationship should exist as easily within a multilat-
eral as a bilateral context. But see Colin B. Picker, International Trade as an Tool for
Peace: Empiricism, Change, Passion, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (forthcoming)
(arguing that international trade is largely irrelevant to armed conflict reduction).
87 For example, by generating a greater understanding of the law when work-
ing through to a resolution of the conflicts.
88 WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 143-44;
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WTO than was the case with GATT, the enforcement by the WTO
of the Article XXIV requirements is still insufficient. 89 The very
public and repeated failure of the WTO to win this conflict with
RTAs casts a large shadow over the WTO and its legitimacy as a
"rule of law" international organization. Nor will this crisis of le-
gitimacy be confined solely to the interaction of RTAs and the
WTO, but will likely spill over into other aspects of the WTO. This
erosion of the world's trust in WTO institutions and rules may
prove fatal to the WTO.
At a less prominent level, RTA negotiators will confront WTO-
RTA conflicts during RTA negotiations. That conflict may exist as
a result of conflicting goals or the government negotiators may
have to argue for a conflicting position from that which the state
holds within the WTO context.90 These conflicts may never be re-
solved, and may be reflected in ambiguous language in the RTA.91
That ambiguity, in turn, will then likely encourage future con-
flicts -between RTA members, nonmembers, and with the WTO
itself.92 Indeed, these conflicts may arise despite the fact that RTA
members may have appeared to have resolved the issue and ex-
WORLD BANK, TRADE BLOCS, supra note 14, at 109 (outlining restrictions imposed
by Article XXIV on rights of RTAs and noting difficulties with the Article); Kara-
sik, supra note 8, at 541-42 (noting that Article XXIV is seldom complied with).
89 There is, however, some cause for optimism that these conflicts will be
treated more seriously by the WTO. For example, the employment of the DSB in
RTA cases is a good sign. See, e.g., Turkey Case, supra note 68, 42-63 (rejecting
a defense under Article XXIV). The Understanding on Art. XXIV also clarified the
relationship of the Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU") with RTAs. See
Understanding on Art. XXIV, supra note 66, para. 12 ("The provisions of Articles
XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994 ... may be invoked with respect to any matters
arising from the application of those provisions of Article XXIV relating to... free
trade areas") (emphasis added).
90 An example could be concessions on agricultural protections in the RTA,
while holding firm against any such reductions within the multilateral process.
91 See ABBOT, supra note 21, at 3 (discussing the relationship between WTO
and regional integration agreements).
92 Rules of origin are a good example of the trouble that may exist between
attempts at harmonizing those rules in the multilateral context, and the resistance
to such harmonization within RTAs. See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 143 (discussing whether rules of origin are a regula-
tion of commerce); WORK OF THE COMMITTEE ON REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
(CRTA) (describing institutional problems from the absence of WTO rules or dis-
crepancies between WTO rules and those in some RTAs), at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/region-e/regcom-e.htm; see also WORLD
BANK, TRADE BLOCS, supra note 14, at 72 ("In some cases membership in multiple
RTAs creates obligations made in one that contradict those made in others.").
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plicitly committed it to the text of the RTA.93
Conflict also arises in the implementation of RTAs. Once the
RTA is concluded and the provisions are in operation, the possi-
bilities for conflict between RTAs and the WTO are almost innu-
merable. Those conflicts may be a result of substantive or competi-
tive factors. Substantively, conflicts between RTAs and the WTO
occur because the RTAs include provisions or rules that may sug-
gest different requirements than those in the WTO. 94 A perfect ex-
ample of a substantive conflict between an RTA and the WTO ap-
pears in NAFTA, which does not clearly resolve the issue of the
relationship between the WTO and NAFTA agreements. 95 Two of
the very few NAFTA state-to-state disputes were forced to con-
front this issue,96 an issue still unresolved ten years later.
97 An-
93 See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 34, art. 101, 32 I.L.M. at 297 (establishing
NAFTA pursuant to Article XXIV of GATF); id. art. 103(1), 32 I.L.M. at 297 (affirm-
ing existing rights and obligations to each other under GATT); id. art. 103(2), 32
I.L.M. at 297 (establishing that NAFTA prevails in the event of an inconsistency).
94 This is not to say that every provision conflicts, for many RTAs cover trade
issues not presently covered by the WTO. Some examples where there is no over-
lap are NAFTA's coverage of labor, North American Agreement on Labor Coop-
eration, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499; NAFTA's coverage of the environment,
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 1480; and the EU's coverage of competition law, Consolidated Version of
the Treaty Establishing the European Union, Oct. 2, 1997, arts. 81-89, 37 I.L.M. 56,
93-95. The EU maintains a website on its competition activities. European Com-
mision, Activities of the European Union Competition, at http://europa.eu.int/
pol/comp/index-en.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2005).
95 Abbott, supra note 26, at 177-78. See also NAFTA, supra note 34, art. 103(2),
32 I.L.M. at 297 ("In the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and
such other Agreements, this Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the inconsis-
tency, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement"). The "otherwise pro-
vided" language has caused complications. For example, even though NAFTA
came into effect before the WTO, and was drafted before the Uruguay Round re-
sults were known, NAFTA possibly incorporated the future, yet unknowable,
WTO agreements in certain instances. See id. art. 309(1), 32 I.L.M. at 303 (incorpo-
rating GAT[ provisions); id. at n.5, 32 I.L.M. at 394 (incorporating GATT provi-
sions); id. Annex 702.1, 32 I.L.M. at 370 (incorporating CUSFTA Article 710); see
also ABBOTT, supra note 21, at 3.
96 NAFTA Arbitral Panel, Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain U.S.-Origin
Agricultural Products, CDA-95-2008-01, paras. 138-54, (Dec. 2, 1996), available at
http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/app/DocRepository/l/Dispute/english/
NAFTAChapter_20/Canada/cb95010e.pdf; NAFTA Arbitral Panel, U.S. Safe-
guard Action Taken on Broomcorn Brooms from Mexico, USA-97-2008-01, para.
50 Oan. 30, 1998) (explaining that NAFTA may take precedence over some or all
WTO rules), available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/app/DocRepository/1/
Dispute/english/NAFTAChapter_20/USA/ub97010e.pdf. See also, Cho, Break-
ing the Barrier, supra note 73, at 462-63 (reporting on the United States-Canada tar-
iff dispute).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol26/iss2/2
2005] REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS V. THE WTO 291
other example of RTA conflict with the WTO relates to the EU's
preferential arrangements with its former colonies. 98 That relation-
ship led to a long and full scale conflict in the WTO, with the
United States taking charge.99 Such conflicts can create or exacer-
bate serious conflict between the two economic superpowers, and
correspondingly impede their ability to work closely together.
Furthermore, even when eventually resolved, the effort expended
and conflict created is considerable. The consequences can endure
for years and shape state and institutional behavior and develop-
ment. Even leaving aside "tit-for-tat" retaliation, the resolution of
one such conflict will not serve to fend off future conflicts between
RTAs and the WTO. This is because the substantive provisions of
RTAs so often reflect different goals, cultures, and histories. 100
Another substantive conflict may arise with respect to negotia-
tions within the WTO when the RTA has committed to negotiate as
one unit rather than through the individual state members of the
RTA. Achieving consensus is difficult, creates conflicts, and even-
tually may impede the ability of that RTA and its members to par-
ticipate in the WTO negotiations. 101 An example of such a conflict
is the unusual dual nature of the EU in the WTO -where both the
member states individually and the EU collectively are WTO
97 See ABBOTr, supra note 21, at 107, 170, 177-87 ("NAFTA and WTO panels
may develop different answers to the same questions arising under the same
agreements .... ").
98 The agreement covering these preferential arrangements had a waiver,
Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lom6, Dec. 15, 1989, African, Caribbean and Pa-
cific States-European Economic Community, 29 I.L.M. 783, but the issue that was
subsequently litigated was the scope of the waiver, as what was outside that
waiver would not be covered and would be subject to the MFN. See Fourth ACP-
EEC Convention of Lom6, Dec. 9, 1994, Declaration of the Contracting Parties,
GATI Doc. L/7604. The Lom6 Convention has now been replaced by the Coto-
nou Convention. See generally Regina Gerrick, The Cotonou Agreement: Will it Suc-
cessfully Improve the Small Island Economies of the Caribbean?, 27 B.C. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 131 (2004) (describing the Cotonou Agreement).
99 See, e.g., European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Dis-
tribution of Bananas (Bananas III), Sept. 25, 1997 (AB WT/DS27/AB/R) (finding
violations of GATr Articles XI and XIII).
10 Cottier, supra note 14, at 153. Thus, resolution of NAFTA's prohibition on
the increase of tariffs conflicting with the WTO Agriculture Agreement's require-
ment that tariffs be applied instead of quotas (hence increasing tariffs) will most
likely be inapplicable to the next RTAs' conflict with the Agricultural Agreement's
tariff provisions. This lack of uniformity is an exacerbating factor that is espe-
cially troubling-hence the Proposal's harmonization provisions. See infra Section
V.
101 Abbott, supra note 26, at 176.
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members.102 This internal conflict is especially contentious if the
RTA is itself in the process of internal negotiation or reformation. 103
As well as creating RTA-WTO, RTA-RTA, and RTA-state con-
flict, RTAs may also exacerbate conflict between the developed and
the developing world. One mechanism that precipitates that con-
flict is Article XXIV, and it is considered to apply in a more relaxed
fashion to developing countries. 04 Developing countries, then,
may more easily achieve preferential advantages, particularly with
developed countries. This is particularly problematic, if at the
same time as negotiating or working those agreements, the devel-
oping countries are able to operate as a bloc to stop WTO devel-
opment unless their demands are met. As a bloc they will be able
to hold out for longer, believing that in the meantime they will be
achieving many of their goals through RTAs, particularly RTAs
with developed countries. This sort of conflict can seriously retard
the development of the multilateral system.
In addition to conflicts arising out of substantive provisions,
there will also be conflicts arising from the competition of the mar-
ketplace. Most notably, conflict will be generated as a consequence
of the fact that RTAs are exceptions to the MFN principle. In other
words, states outside an RTA will find their ability to play in the
RTA market significantly impeded, and, in the language of GATT
Article I's MFN, they will not be favored. This is likely to engender
bad feelings and jealousy at being denied access to what may have
been, or may be in the future, a lucrative, and perhaps essential,
102 Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, The European Court of Justice and the WTO: Problems
and Challenges, in THE EU, THE WTO AND THE NAFTA: TOWARDS A COMMON LAW
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE? 73 (J.H.H. Weiler ed., 2000).
103 This may impact the role of the RTA members in the WTO as they form
alliances that they would not otherwise form, or adhere to positions that have
more to do with the goals of the RTA or its members than that of the individual
country and the WTO. Abbott, supra note 26, at 177.
104 See Decision on Differential and More Favorable Treatment Reciprocity
and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, Nov. 28, 1979, B.I.S.D. (26th
Supp.) at 203 (1980) [hereinafter GSP Waiver] (allowing favorable treatment of
developing countries) available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal-e
/enablinge.pdf; WORLD BANK, TRADE BLOCS, supra note 14, at 110-111 (arguing
that in practice, developing countries have had "carte blanche" in setting up RTAs
under Article XXIV); see also JACKSON (1969), supra note 47, at 590 (explaining that
during GATT, Article XXIV was applied to developing countries in a "somewhat
less stringent" manner); Bhala, supra note 11, at 310-15 (describing the history of
the inclusion of special rules on development in the Havana Charter RTA clauses
and in GATT Article XXIV).
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market.105 Such jealousy is easily converted into conflict, despite
the fact that it has long been thought that trade between states re-
duces the likelihood of traditional use-of-force conflict.10 6 Cer-
tainly, such conflict has existed in the past and was a factor in the
increased economic tensions of the 1920s and 1930s. Furthermore,
while states will not likely resort to the traditional use of force,
there are plenty of other mechanisms for a state to express its dis-
pleasure. Thus, the fact that the RTA is regional and exclusive will
likely cause conflict.10 7
Another area of "competition conflict" arises when two RTAs
compete between themselves as economic units: either for mar-
kets, influence, or power within the world trading system. This
competition is exacerbated by the overlapping of RTAs' coverage
of sectors and territories, the so-called Spaghetti Bowl of regula-
tions of overlapping RTAs.108 RTAs not only cause "competition
conflict" with the WTO, other states, and with other RTAs, but
they also, ironically, cause conflict within their own RTAs. For
sure, while they have removed much conflict by entering into an
RTA, unless that RTA is well created, it is likely to produce its own
measure of conflict between the RTA members. Indeed, it may not
be possible to create an RTA that will not produce some measure
of conflict between states, as the governments of each state seek to
maximize the benefits to their constituents. Accordingly, competi-
tion, while healthy and necessary in economic markets, must be
considered from a slightly different perspective when the competi-
tors are sovereign states, with all the independence of action such
sovereignty implies.
In addition to conflicts created during RTA negotiations or dur-
ing its implementation, conflicts may be created or exacerbated by
the differing jurisprudences of the RTAs and the WTO. These con-
105 See Karasik, supra note 8, at 552-53 (noting the examples of Arabs fearful
that Israel will benefit from closer economic interaction just as France feared the
economic aid the United States sent to West Germany following the Second World
War).
106 See, Picker, supra note 86 (manuscript at 5, on file with author).
107 It should be noted that not all RTAs must be exclusive. There has been
some discussion of open RTAs - RTAs that allow any state to join. FRANKEL, supra
note 6, at 225, 231, 238-39. But, such open RTAs, to the extent they exist at all, are
the exception to the typical RTA. The term is generally associated with the Asia
Pacific Economic Forum ("APEC"), though it is unclear just how applicable the
term is to that arrangement. Id. at 238 n.5.
108 WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PERSPECrVES, supra note 4, at 38-40.
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flicts are particularly problematic as the jurisprudence created may
have long lasting consequences within each of the arrangements.
In reality, those conflicts have formed a significant share of the is-
sues facing both the multilateral adjudicatory body, the DSB, and
the RTA secretariats and their adjudicatory bodies.109 With in-
creased employment of DSUs in RTAs, such conflicts with the
WTO will continue to proliferate. We find the conflicts played out
again and again within the adjudicatory bodies, confusing the
trade community and sowing further conflict in its wake." 0 This is
despite the fact that RTAs should complement, not compete with,
the WTO."'
Of course, RTAs often serve to reduce conflict, but they also
create a great deal of conflict. Furthermore, this conflict is created
at all stages of the life of an RTA and serves to weaken the multi-
lateral trade institution as a whole: through the creation of the per-
ception of illegitimacy; through the obstacles that conflict places in
the way of the development and effective implementation of the
WTO; through the role conflict plays in the erosion of state enthu-
siasm for the multilateral system in general; and by diverting re-
sources from the WTO development process. As the Proposal is
structured, it should leave intact the conflict reduction aspects of
RTAs while reducing or eliminating many of the conflict creation
features of RTAs.
4.2. Resource Diversion
In addition to conflict creation and erosion of states' enthusi-
asm for the multilateral trade system, RTAs also divert resources
from the multilateral trade system to the negotiation, development,
and nurturing of RTAs. To the extent states engage in RTA nego-
tiation and development, with its concomitant expenditure of
scarce energies and resources, these are resources denied to WTO
development." 2 It is not just the formation of RTAs that saps the
109 Abbott, supra note 26, at 177 n.27.
110 Id., at 177-78 n.30.
111 See Turkey Case, supra note 68, 9.163 and 1.186-.187 (concluding that
"the objectives of regional trade agreements and those of the GATT and the WTO
have always been complimentary, and therefore should be interpreted consis-
tently with one another."); see also, Cho, Breaking the Barrier, supra note 73, at 446-
47 (discussing how the objective of trade regionalism lies in complementing the
global trading system).
112 This concept, of RTA resource diversion, is not new-it has been dis-
cussed before, albeit briefly-too briefly, often receiving no more than a sentence
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institutional life-blood of the WTO, but RTAs' ongoing mainte-
nance as well, through their dispute resolution, renegotiation, and
amendment processes." 3 Resources and enthusiasm applied to the
development of RTAs or litigation regarding RTAs are conse-
quently resources unavailable for the nurturing of the WTO.
114
As an initial matter, it is necessary to explain what is meant in
this Article by the concept of resources in the trade system. The is-
sue of resource diversion in this Article is not confined to the usual
considerations of national economic sectoral diversion or macro-
economic efficiency traditionally raised when critiquing RTAs.
Rather, the resource issue in this Article is strictly concerned with
institutional resource issues. While ignored or treated as a minor
issue by those involved on the ground in trade matters, as a result
of their local and personal perspectives, there is no doubt that there
must be a cost to the formation and maintenance of RTAs. Trade
agreements are not free; they cost in terms of the resources ex-
pended to create and nurture them, including resources inevitably
involved in litigation in and about those RTAs." 5  Indeed,
"[r]eserves of administrative skill, political capital, or imagination
are finite, if they are devoted to a [RTA] they are not available for
multilateral objectives." 116 True, there may be cost savings for mul-
tilateral development as a result of RTA development and mainte-
nance, but those benefits can surely be gained in a less destructive
manner.
or paragraph. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note
4, at 133 ("proliferating regional agreements absorb scarce negotiating re-
sources").
113 See YARBROUGH & YARBROUGH, supra note 20, at 20 ("Bounded rationality
and an uncertain future make it impossible to write long-term agreements that
can govern a continuing relationship without periodic renegotiation; but the po-
tential for opportunistic behavior makes adjustment and renegotiation problem-
atic, since parties cannot be counted on to renegotiate in 'good faith."').
114 See LAWRENCE, supra note 37, at 39 ("Trade policymakers who are negotiat-
ing and operating regional agreements will have less time and fewer resources
available for multilateral negotiations.").
115 FRANKEL, supra note 6, at 214. Such involvement uses up a huge amount
of resources. The United States and the EU rely upon assistance from the private
sector, a resource not always available in many countries. See generally GREGORY
C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO
LmGATION 160 (2003) (raising the issue that "[ijf the United States and the EC de-
pend on assistance from private firms and trade associations, what does this bode
for developing country participation in the system?").
116 WORLD BANK, TRADE BLOCS, supra note 14, at 104. See table of different
country involvement in WTO litigation in SHAFFER, supra note 115, at 157-58.
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The specific resources include the governmental officials in in-
ternational trade -involved both full and part time in international
trade -budgets of the different offices devoted to the trade system,
and may also include nongovernmental participants, such as in-
dustry or academic actors." 7 Accordingly, a state's human re-
sources, governmental and private, may be diverted from the mul-
tilateral to the regional trade system. 1 8 The primary diversion of
resources, however, occurs to the state's own workers engaged in
international trade -from the ministers in charge, to the rank-and-
file trade negotiators and litigators, to the customs officers on the
ground.1 9 In this critique each will be considered, for each plays a
vital role in the development of the multilateral trade system.
Starting at the "top," government ministers may find that they
spend scarce time and energy finalizing the negotiations of RTAs
with both public and private participants. Further, time will be
expended shuttling back and forth between capitals working with
foreign parties. Of course, the minister must work domestically,
visiting with the different branches of government, trying to per-
suade typically protectionist legislators of the benefits of the pro-
posed RTA. Additional time may also be spent holding public
hearings or attending conferences on contentious issues in the
RTA. To the extent that the same minister would otherwise have
spent that time working on multilateral trade issues, that is time
and political capital lost, perhaps never to be regained.
Moving down the hierarchy, to the "worker bees," involved in
the "nitty gritty" of international trade negotiation, litigation, and
maintenance, we see the same drain of time and energy. RTAs are
particularly time-consuming inasmuch as they require considera-
tion of many detailed issues with different countries, involving dif-
ferent RTAs, with different issues, with different and complex pro-
visions, histories, and cultures. By way of example, an official
117 See generally, SHAFFER, supra note 115, at 33, 148, 159 (discussing various
resources in the EU and United States which go toward the WTO).
118 FRANKEL, supra note 6, at 204. Indeed, this resource issue is particularly
problematic for developing countries that may not have large resources, private or
public, devoted to participation in the world trade system. Thus, very quickly
their involvement in RTAs, especially with developed countries, will serve as a
significant drain on their limited resources. WORLD BANK, TRADE BLOCS, supra
note 14, at 104. Additionally, developed country negotiating demands may also
serve to stretch the capabilities of the much smaller developing country negotia-
tion team. Id.
119 See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL EcONOMIc PERSPECrIVES, supra note 4, at 126.
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working on a RTA and assigned the task of resolving dispute set-
tlement issues would have to consider and manage, through the
life of the RTA, the following dispute settlement issues: the ap-
propriate rules and procedures; the appointment of the arbitrator
rosters; the funding of the dispute resolution institution; the role of
the jurisprudence; the reporting of the jurisprudence; the consis-
tency across cases and adjudicatory bodies; the role of the private
sector (directly and indirectly in dispute issues); the relationship
between the WTO and the RTA's dispute processes and rules; and
collection and maintenance of relevant records. These issues con-
stitute a logistical nightmare and would serve as a significant ob-
stacle to this official's ability to contribute to the development of
the WTO. 120 Yet, the issue of dispute settlement institutions is
merely one of hundreds of important issues that must be handled
for each and every RTA. The aggregate time required to adminis-
ter these RTAs and their interaction with other RTAs and the WTO
is simply astounding.121
This significant resource drain is even apparent with respect to
those government, customs, and compliance officials engaged in
the on-the-ground movement of trade. The employment of RTAs
causes a significant workload increase for those officials. RTAs
add levels of complexity that would otherwise be absent. 122 In par-
120 See, e.g., David A. Gantz, Government-to-Government Dispute Resolution Un-
der NAFTA's Chapter 20: A Commentary on the Process, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 481,
491-92 (2000) (detailing various obstacles to the dispute resolution process). Fur-
thermore, with different RTAs, states must deal with different fora (geographi-
cally and substantively) in the different RTAs' dispute settlement institutions and
procedures. For examples of United States' adjudication with its RTA partners,
see Israel-United States Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 22, 1985, U.S.-Israel, art. 19,
24 I.L.M. 653, 664-65 available at http://www.mac.doc.gov/tcc/data/
commerce_html/TCC_Documents/IsraelFreeTrade.html; NAFTA, supra note 34,
ch. 20, 32 I.L.M. at 693-99; U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, May 6, 2003,
U.S.-Singapore, ch. 20, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/
Trade.Agreements/Bilateral/SingaporeFTA/FinalTexts/asset upload file708_
4036.pdf.
121 Juggling the RTA with domestic law is an additional drain on administra-
tive time.
122 See BI-HAGWATI, A STREAM OF WINDOws, supra note 11, at 290-91 (discussing
his "spaghetti bowl" theory concerning ever-complex rules of origins emanating
from RTAs and the negative consequences for government and private industry).
But see WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PERSPECTRIVS, supra note 4, at 77-95 (dis-
cussing the many ways that RTAs could be employed to bring these costs down -
through harmonization -though the Report focuses mainly on a one-RTA model
and does not discuss the impact of the different rules on the customs official try-
ing to determine which of many complex rules apply to a good, parts of which
come from different states, all of which are in different RTA relationships with the
297
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. 1. Int'l Econ. L.
ticular, for every product entering the country, these officials must
consider the varied rules of origin and special tariff rates (and oc-
casionally quotas), as well as other complex trade issues. This
must make, even with sophisticated technology, an already diffi-
cult job all the more difficult.123 This added workload draws those
officials away from the smoother and more efficient interaction of
national customs clearance and the WTO's rules and require-
ments.124
The involvement with RTAs is no minor drain on government
resources, even for the most economically developed countries.
Typically, states staff their trade offices with a few dedicated spe-
cialists operating in a trade office and occasionally in foreign mis-
sions. Those officials are then supplemented with specialists from
the many other government departments occasionally involved in
trade matters. Thus, there may only be a few government officials
that have a real feel for the details and complexities of an increas-
ingly specialized set of subfields within international trade law.
These workers are then called on to juggle the different issues and
alliances involved. Furthermore, because workers change jobs, re-
sponsibilities, and advance into different roles (often leaving in
place those not competent to handle the work 25), and because gov-
ernment administrations often change after elections, the difficult
task of administering the many different trade agreements is made
all the more complex. And, of course, alongside time and energy
resources, there are also expenditures of finite political capital. To
the extent government officials expend political capital on RTAs,
there may very well be less for multilateral endeavors.126 Such a
customs officer's state).
123 See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL EcONOMIc PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 68 (not-
ing that rules of origin are "increasing the burdens on customs services in many
countries, and these burdens have consequent implications for trade.").
124 The diversion from enforcement and compliance of the WTO's conces-
sions and agreements, must also serve to erode those same multilateral agree-
ments and concessions. This, in turn, impacts the observation of the effectiveness
of those multilateral agreements, which in turn has an impact on the provisions of
future multilateral agreements.
125 See, e.g., RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1448 (2d ed.
2001) (defining "Peter Principle" as a "satirical 'law[]' concerning organizational
structure... that holds that people tend to be promoted until they reach their
level of incompetence" -thus resulting in a cadre of incompetence at all levels of
government).
126 Of course, successful RTAs may "replenish" political capital that can then
be expended on multilateral objectives -though the measurement and realization
of success in the RTA context is perhaps sufficiently elusive as to undermine the
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situation suggests that the drain of time, energy, and knowledge
base from the WTO to RTAs must reduce the effective participation
of states in the development of the WTO.'
27
Another diversion of governmental resources away from the
WTO takes place at the legislative level. Normally the executive
branch of government handles trade matters. The legislatures are,
however, often called upon to take part in the ratification process
and to implement trade agreements in domestic law and/or to
pass the necessary secondary legislation.128 This can constitute a
tremendous expenditure of time on floor debates, committee hear-
ings, and meetings with administration and private interests. In
addition to national governmental bodies, subfederal entities such
as the Canadian provinces, may also play a role that varies accord-
ing to the constitutional and practical divisions of powers within
each country.129 To the extent these legislative or subfederal enti-
ties are engaged in RTAs, that is time away from the busy sched-
ules that could otherwise be devoted to the multilateral system.
A similar diversion of scarce time and political capital from the
WTO to RTAs can be attributed to lobbyists and other private par-
ties.130 Those participants include industry representatives (lobby-
ists included), nongovernmental organizations, public interest ac-
tivists, academics, and think tanks.131  Indeed, those non-
possibility of replenishment.
127 Also, there will be times when, for smaller less developed countries in
particular, that but for the RTA work, an official with insufficient multilateral
work would be working in a nontrade area for part of the time -and thus in-
volvement in RTAs allows that official to work more in the trade field and so de-
velop greater skills and knowledge to bring to the multilateral objectives of the
state. However, such a benefit is offset by the conflicts raised by the obligations
and duties of the RTA versus those imposed and required by the WTO. See dis-
cussion supra Section 4.1.
128 An example of this is the recent expenditure of time and effort on the
United States-Central America Free Trade Agreement. See Grassley, Blunt Wants
CAFTA Passage in Possible Lame Duck Session, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, July 30, 2004, at
31.
129 See, e.g., Colin B. Picker, Reputational Fallacies In International Law: A Com-
parative Analysis of U.S. and Canadian Trade Actions, 30 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 67, 83-84
(2004).
130 Grassley, Blunt Want CAFTA Passage in Possible Lame Duck Session, supra
note 128.
131 It should be noted that the level and sophistication of the involvement
varies across countries -to such an extent that this resource diversion actually as-
sumes a greater impact than may be obvious in such places as the United States,
and even the EU. Indeed, while such a public-private partnership is alive and
well in the United States, and emerging in the EU, it is certainly not sufficiently
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governmental participants are actively involved in all stages of in-
ternational trade policy: from assisting with negotiating (usually
behind the scenes) to assistance with compliance.132 Industry is di-
rectly impacted by the specific rules of the RTAs, from the private
remedies provisions to the supposedly neutral rules of origin in the
different RTAs.133 Private participation is even more significant
when there are controversial provisions, for example, on environ-
ment or labor. 34 All of the private participants' involvement with
RTAs serves as a significant distraction from their necessary in-
volvement in the development of the multilateral system.135 After
all, private parties, like governments, also have limited resources.
To the extent that they work on RTAs, there are correspondingly
fewer resources, be it person-power or public relations expendi-
tures, to ensure political or logistical support for the creation and
maintenance of the WTO.
Certainly there are arguments that the officials and private par-
ticipants can do both tasks, and some of them may even do each
better as a result of their experiences from the other. Yet, there can
be little doubt that if these non-state participants applied them-
selves one hundred percent to the WTO, the WTO would have pro-
gressed much further in its first ten years.
4.3. Erosion of WTO Enthusiasm
Before examining the role of RTAs in the erosion of enthusiasm
for the WTO, the concept of enthusiasm must first be defined for
purposes of this Article. "Enthusiasm," in this Article, and consis-
present in most other parts of the world. See SHAFFER, supra note 115, at 160 (sug-
gesting that developing countries may not have the resources to implement
RTAs). It may well be that to the extent there is an industry with sufficient inter-
est and capability to mobilize such a partnership, it would be more interested in
RTAs for the benefit of specific markets than in pursuing a global strategy.
132 See generally SHAFFER, supra note 115, at 10-18 (describing the role of public
and private organizations in implementing international trade policy).
133 WORLD BANK, TRADE BLocs, supra note 14, at 104.
134 Grassley, Blunt Want CAFTA Passage In Possible Lame Duck Session, supra
note 128.
135 The existence of these RTAs diverts academics' time to analyze and re-
search RTA issues, when that time and effort may be better directed to assisting in
the development of the WTO. This Article would be a perfect example of aca-
demic time diverted from the study of the WTO to the study of RTAs -but for the
Article's goal of improving the WTO and protecting it from the institutional threat
posed by those same RTAs.
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tent with dictionary definitions, 136 means the dedicated and serious
support to a cause -in this case, the multilateral system as exem-
plified by the WTO. "Enthusiasm" includes within the term, the
possession of knowledge of the cause and application of one's
imagination to that cause. Even before exploring the concept in de-
tail, it appears that the existence of RTAs makes it impossible, defi-
nitionally, for states to be both enthusiastic about RTAs and the
WTO-as dedication to two different trade relation mechanisms
appears not to be possible - at least, not easily possible.
As with conflict creation and resource diversion, RTAs have a
pernicious effect on WTO enthusiasm-they are eroding states'
and their negotiators' enthusiasm for the WTO. That enthusiasm,
furthermore, is not and has not always been guaranteed. Though,
today that enthusiasm is even more tenuous in light of the recent
challenges facing the multilateral trade system. These challenges
include: the fact that the WTO includes more countries than ever
before, reflecting a greater diversity of economies and opinions on
the future of the WTO;137 the traditional state power structure in
the WTO is more diffuse; 138 the traditional negotiating mecha-
nisms, as exemplified by the "Green Room," are dysfunctional;
139
136 "[Aibsorbing or controlling possession of the mind by any interest or pur-
suit"; "ardent interest." The final meaning, though archaic, is still consistent with
this Article's use of the term-"extreme religious devotion." RANDOM HOUSE
WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICHIONARY 649 (2d ed. 2001).
137 There are 148 members (October 13, 2004) and 30 "Observer Govern-
ments," all of which (with the exception of the Holy See (Vatican)) must start or
have started accession negotiations within five years of becoming an "Observer"
of the WTO. WTO, Members and Observers, at http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto-e/whatis.e/tife/org6_e.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2005).
138 The United States is not the hegemon anymore. Japan, the EU, Brazil, and
groupings of countries have stepped up to exert influence and power in the ongo-
ing WTO negotiations.
139 The "Green Room" was a device whereby a small number of interested
countries (varying by the issue) would meet in private to hammer out the difficult
parts of the trade negotiations at GATT and WTO meetings, presenting the con-
clusions to the remainder of the GATT signatories or WTO members for their ac-
ceptance. Today, there are simply too many WTO members that want to be in-
volved in the negotiations for the Green Room mechanism to work as effectively
as in prior times. The system finally broke down at the Seattle Ministerial in 2000.
See JEFFREY J. SCHOTr & JAYASHREE WATAL, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS POLICY BRIEF 00-2: DECISION-MAKING IN THE WTO (2000) (exploring is-
sues that arose at Seattle and recommending changes), at http://www.iie.com/
publications/pb/pbOO-2.htm; see also Cho, A Bridge Too Far, supra note 2, at 241
(discussing alternatives to the traditional great power driven negotiations in the
"Green Room").
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the trade issues today are more complex than simply the reduction
of tariffs on discrete tariff lines;140 and in an increasingly transpar-
ent world, negotiations with their traditionally hidden political
costs are now more difficult. Given these realities, it is no wonder
that state enthusiasm for the WTO is fragile. That fragility, how-
ever, may prove insufficient to fend off the impact of the prolifera-
tion of RTAs.
14'
Perhaps the clearest RTA source for this erosion of enthusiasm
is simply that states perceive it to be easier and more effective to
negotiate RTAs to achieve their specific goals quickly and directly.
Given that perception, it would be surprising if that enthusiasm
was not eroded 42 Another significant factor in the erosion of
WTO enthusiasm is the fact that the proliferation of RTAs may it-
self cast doubt on the WTO's underlying rationale, its legitimacy,
by undermining the multilateralism for which it stands.143 That le-
gitimacy is further eroded when states consider the failure of the
GATT, and now the WTO, to police RTA compliance with Article
XXV.144 This continuing failure casts serious doubt about the
WTO's commitment to a multilateral Rule of Law. 45 The legiti-
macy of the WTO, and associated enthusiasm for it, cannot easily
withstand the erosion of the Rule of Law. The knowledge that
140 See generally Cho, A Bridge Too Far, supra note 2 (discussing the many-
faceted reasons for the present negotiating impasse).
141 See ABBOTT, supra note 21, at 155-59 (surveying economic analysis of RTAs,
suggesting considerable uncertainty about the economic implications of RTAs).
There are economic studies and modeling that at a theoretical level support the
proliferation of RTAs, though with changes in the modeling parameters, the op-
posite conclusion can be reached. See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 34 (surveying the impact of RTAs). This ability to
change parameters to get the result desired, brings to mind President Truman's
search for a "one-handed economist." See The Princeton Review, Major: Economics,
at http://www.princetonreview.com/ college/research/majors/ funfacts.asp?
MajorID-86 (last visited Apr. 11, 2005).
142 Jagdish Bhagwati, Beyond NAFTA: Clinton's Trading Choices, FOREIGN
POL'Y, Summer 1993, at 155 (contrasting NAFTA and GATF); see also Hilaire &
Yang, supra note 40, at 622 (discussing bilateralism).
143 Cho, Breaking the Barrier, supra note 73, at 451-52; see also, Karasik, supra
note 8, at 541 (supporting the assertion of bilaterism).
144 See KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 275 (1970) ("The effort to attain precision and to force future ar-
rangements into Article XXIV's mold proved to be... a failure, if not a fiasco.").
145 See id., at 275 (discussing serious ambiguities in Article XXIV); see also
Kevin A. Wechter, NAFTA: A Complement to GATT or a Setback to Global Free
Trade?, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2611, 2614 (providing history of early GATT failure to
enforce Article XX1V against some of the early and important RTAs).
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RTA rules that are opposite to the general WTO rules can survive
challenge will lead a trade negotiator to question the benefit of ne-
gotiating global rules that will be diluted by the ever increasing le-
gions of RTAs around the world.
The erosion of enthusiasm for the WTO may also be caused by
an excessive focus on RTAs by local policy makers, academics, and
government civil servants busy concentrating on putting RTAs into
operation. Consequently, those policy makers will have less en-
thusiasm for the WTO as they are fixated on the RTA. For exam-
ple, in the EU, there is considerably more knowledge and involve-
ment (enthusiasm) with EU law than that of the WTO -despite the
centrality of the WTO to the EU and convergence in much of the
substantive parts.146 Similarly, a comparable loss of enthusiasm for
the multilateral treatment of specific substantive trade issues may
be associated with the fact that those issues are being developed
within RTAs. Examples could include competition law or labor is-
sues.147 The treatment of such issues in RTAs likely makes it
harder to mobilize support for their inclusion in the WTO. This is
a problem for the WTO, to the extent one believes such efforts
should proceed through the WTO.
As mentioned infra Section 4.1., the many conflicts created by
the negotiation for and operation of RTAs also serve to reduce en-
thusiasm for the multilateral system. This occurs not only because
there may be a reduction in support for any multilateral system
that allows RTAs to create such conflict, but also because of the
consequences of the conflicts themselves. States may be reluctant
to be involved in the negotiation of new WTO agreements that
may place the state in conflict with many different and already op-
146 J.H.H. Weiler, Cain and Abel-Convergence and Divergence in International
Trade Law, in THE EU, THE WTO AND THE NAFTA (.H.H. Weiler ed., 2000). But,
note that the World Bank Report asserts that "neither the EU nor the United States
seem to be less disposed toward multilateral negotiations because of their RTAs
or the RTAs of other." WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note
4, at 134. But the same study then suggests that the evidence and studies do not
provide support for either view of the impact of RTAs on multilateral negotia-
tions. Id. at 136. Also, the Report's study of United States actions post-Cancun in
pursuing RTAs suggests that the United States is less committed to multilateral
negotiations than it would otherwise be in the absence of such RTA possibilities.
The Report then suggests these negotiations have not impacted the United States'
involvement in the WTO negotiations-though it is hard to believe how that could
be in light of the finite level of resources available, even for such a large country as
the United States. Similarly for the EU. Id. at 136-37.
147 These two examples are ably dealt with in RTAs: competition law being
dealt with in the EU and labor issues in NAFTA. See supra note 95.
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erational RTAs. Similarly, a state, if a member of an RTA, may end
up in a conflict with the WTO as a result of any new developments
in the WTO. Thus, the benefits of the RTA may be lost when mul-
tilateral obligations "kick in." This will then lead to opposition to
the multilateral negotiations by those that benefit from the RTA.
148
Similarly, the other institutional threat of RTAs, resource diversion,
discussed infra Section 4.2., also plays into the decline of WTO en-
thusiasm. The loss or diversion of resources makes state enthusi-
asm for multilateral negotiations particularly difficult. Over-
worked government or private parties, covering too many different
issues, will likely find it difficult to muster sufficient enthusiasm
for the multilateral trade system.
Some loss of enthusiasm is also related to a state's domestic
constituencies, many of whom are vital partners in the develop-
ment of a state's trade policy. For example, once an industry gains
from an RTA, that industry may be less enthusiastic to provide its
valuable support for multilateral agreements. This may occur as a
result of the industry achieving its international trade goals
through the RTA or because it perceives that the multilateral ef-
forts may actually reduce the benefits it already received in the
RTA. This latter situation may even lead the industry to work
against further development of the multilateral trade system. Fur-
thermore, the industries' reduced enthusiasm, when characterized
as concerns about employment and tax contributions, will quickly
spread to policy makers.1 49
This loss of enthusiasm, like so much else in the institutional
battle between RTAs and the WTO, feeds itself and ends up in a vi-
cious circle. For example, it may very well be the case that states,
particularly smaller states, that are disillusioned with the pace of
development of the WTO, will assertively negotiate RTAs to send a
clear signal to WTO negotiators that either the pace of WTO devel-
opment is too slow or that their interests in the WTO are not being
represented. 150 But those RTAs then capture the enthusiasm of
those states, further diverting their enthusiasm away from the
WTO. These reductions add incrementally to the lack of enthusi-
asm that then sends other states to the RTA negotiating table, per-
ceiving that they should abandon the failing multilateral for the bi-
148 FRANKEL, supra note 6, at 215.
149 Id. at 215-216.
150 See, e.g., Karasik, supra note 8, at 534 (describing negotiations between
Arab nations and Israel).
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lateral stage. 151 In the process, those states will be unlikely to prof-
fer concessions at the multilateral negotiations, preferring to save
those concessions for bilateral negotiations, to the further harm of
the WTO.152
Accordingly, the many causes and factors in reducing the
world's enthusiasm for multilateral trade developments is serving
to seriously undermine the WTO. That loss of enthusiasm only
tightens the vicious circle of RTA proliferation, undermining the
WTO and, in turn, leading to more RTAs, and continuing the cycle.
The loss of enthusiasm on its own would not be so harmful to the
WTO, but when combined with the conflicts created by RTAs and
then with the diversion of resources from WTO development, that
harm takes on a significance not otherwise possible.
5. CONTOURS OF THE PROPOSAL
This Article proposes serious revisions to the WTO's treatment
of RTAs and to the future institutional relationship between RTAs
and the WTO. Implementation of the Proposal would harmonize
and centrally institutionalize RTAs with the WTO. Each part of the
Proposal is intended to address the institutional issues raised as a
result of the proliferation of RTAs and the impact of that prolifera-
tion on the WTO. A critique of the Proposal is presented infra Sec-
tion 6.
The Proposal initially provides that "[a]ll provisions of [WTO]
Agreements that regulate [RTAs] (and other similar but differently
named trade agreements) are amended to adopt the criteria [of the
Proposal]." 153 The Proposal would serve as a formal amendment
to the WTO agreements insofar as those agreements impact RTAs.
Obviously, the primary provision impacted by the Proposal would
be GATT's Article XXIV. But provisions governing preferential ac-
cess show up in places other than Article XXIV. For example, the
WTO's General Agreement on Trade and Services ("GATS") Arti-
cle V also concerns preferential access.154 Another explicit provi-
'51 It has been suggested that the 1990-1994 upsurge in negotiations and crea-
tion of RTAs was a result of the perception that the Uruguay Round would prove
inconclusive. Cottier, supra note 14, at 153.
152 Hilaire & Yang, supra note 40, at 608.
153 See, supra Section 1.1.
154 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Dec. 15, 1993, art. V; Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 33 I.L.M. 44,
51-52 (1994), THE LEGAL TExTs: THE RESULTs OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 325.
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sion is the "Enabling Clause" of the GATT concerning developing
countries. 55 The Proposal's application beyond Article XXJV is
necessary to ensure all provisions governing preferential arrange-
ments are covered. Failure to include all such issues would leave a
big hole of which countries would quickly take advantage. The
waiver provisions may be employed in this regard; therefore, al-
though developing countries should be afforded all possible ac-
commodations, relevant development policy provisions in the
WTO agreements should, nonetheless, also be covered by this Pro-
posal. 156 Finally, the Proposal takes into account the variability in
the names of such agreements, from "Free Trade Agreements" to
"Preferential Trade Agreements" to "Customs Union," and seeks
to apply to all. Thus, the first provision is intended to provide as
wide a coverage as possible for the Proposal by seeking to elimi-
nate all technical difficulties with its coverage and to cover all rele-
vant provisions of the WTO.
Part 2 of the Proposal provides that "[fluture RTAs and ones
presently under negotiation are permitted only to the extent they
comply with the provisions" of the Proposal and that "[e]xisting
RTAs are to be amended to include the provisions [of the Proposal]
over a phase-in period of five years." 157 This provision is intended
to deal with the treatment of existing RTAs. This is not an incon-
sequential number of agreements, presently over 230.158 Indeed,
the sheer number and coverage of existing RTAs suggests that re-
form of Article XXIV must apply to extant agreements, not just to
future agreements, or else the Proposal will not come close to
achieving its goals.
Just as the original GATT encountered serious opposition with
respect to provisions already in force in countries, so too will this
Proposal. 59 The issue is complicated as many RTAs have been im-
155 GSP Waiver, supra note 104; see also WORLD BANK, TRADE BLOCS, supra note
14, at 110-111 (stating that the "Enabling Clause" is a complication for developing
countries). For information on the WTO's development provisions, see generally
Colin B. Picker, Neither Here nor There-Countries that Are Neither Developing nor De-
veloped in the WTO: Geographic Differentiation as applied to Russia and the WTO, 36
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 147 (2004).
156 Indeed, not only does the proposal not hurt developing countries, it may
even make their position better by relieving them of the institutional pressure of
participation in these regimes. It also, by making negotiation easier, would have
the impact of making it easier for developing countries to enter into RTAs.
157 See supra Section 1.
158 See supra text accompanying note 4.
159 See Protocol of Provisional Application of the GATT, Oct. 30 1947, 55
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plemented through national legislation that was difficult to pass at
the time, and may require new legislation to change. A phase-in
period is consequently a necessary compromise. Of course, for
some RTAs it may prove too complicated to force change, espe-
cially for those RTAs that have moved beyond being trade agree-
ments; where the RTA constitutes a step on the way to political un-
ion or federalism as is the case with the EU. Rather than carve out
exceptions within the Proposal, exceptions should be covered
through the waiver provisions discussed below.
The real heart of the Proposal is its treatment of those RTA
rules and jurisprudence that are inconsistent with the WTO. The
Proposal provides that "[wihere RTA provisions are inconsistent
with WTO Rules, WTO Rules shall be supreme."160 This provision
of the Proposal is intended to deal with much of the conflict and
resource diversion discussed above.'61 Accordingly, harmonizing
those provisions, by bringing the many different provisions into
line with the WTO, will eliminate much of the conflict and resource
diversion, and correspondingly stem the continuing erosion of en-
thusiasm for the WTO. 162 The rules covered would, however, only
be those where there is clear inconsistency between the WTO and
the RTA provisions or where the inconsistency is likely to lead to
real conflict. The Proposal's additional suggestion to employ the
CRTA to identify those provisions that are or will cause such con-
flict is an attempt to ensure that the harmonization proceeds at the
level least likely to disrupt the individual character of the RTAs.
Finally, the committee's involvement should reduce the likelihood
that the endeavor would reduce trade liberalization between RTA
partners where such liberalization is not institutionally harmful to
the WTO.
Simply harmonizing the various RTA rules, however, is insuf-
ficient in light of the role that RTA adjudicatory bodies and their
decisions now play in the development of RTAs. Indeed, the deci-
sions of those bodies are increasingly reported and published, cre-
ating a jurisprudence that can be as significant as the RTA's sub-
U.N.T.S. 308 [hereinafter PPA] (relaxing implementation of GATT so as not to
conflict excessively with existing laws).
160 See supra Section 1.
161 FRANKEL, supra note 6, at 239.
162 For an interesting comparison of the role of the WTO as "harmonizer," see
Arie Reich, The WTO as a Law-Harmonizing Institution, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
321, 327-40 (2004).
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stantive rules themselves.163 While as a formal matter RTA and
WTO cases, and international law adjudication in general, have no
formal weight as precedent, the truth is that they are treated func-
tionally the same way that cases are treated in the common law
world.164 Consequently, it is more important than ever that a de-
gree of jurisprudential consistency is brought to bear across the
many international trade regimes. Accordingly, the Proposal pro-
vides that "The WTO's DSB is either to be employed as the final
arbiter of RTA disputes or to supplant alternative arbiters com-
pletely" 165 and that when deciding those "cases the [WTO] DSB
shall employ WTO jurisprudence to the extent of any inconsistency
with the RTA jurisprudence." 166 The Proposal consequently takes
this emerging "case law" into account, essentially creating a uni-
form international trade jurisprudence. This provision, and the
other harmonization provisions, would firmly bring the RTAs into
the WTO, under the guidance, control, and direction of the WTO.
Having dealt with the substantive conflicts among RTAs, the
Proposal next considers explicit institutional challenges posed by
the proliferation of RTAs. The Proposal provides that "[w]hen ne-
gotiating on RTA matters the Member government officials should
work in cooperation with the WTO Secretariat throughout RTA
negotiations and disputes to ensure consistency and compliance
with the WTO."167 While the WTO Agreements presently require
some interaction with the WTO, that interaction takes place mainly
when RTAs are formed or undergo explicit amendments. WTO
members are presently obliged to provide information to the newly
163 See, e.g., Raj Bhala, The Power of the Past: Towards De Jure Stare Decisis in
WTO Adjudication (Part Three of a Trilogy), 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 873, 875-78
(2001) [hereinafter Bhala, The Power of the Past] (describing the de facto stare de-
cisis effect of WTO decisions); Raj Bhala, The Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare De-
cisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Two Of A Trilogy), 9 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 2
(1999) [hereinafter Bhala, The Precedent Setters] (stating that adherence to stare de-
cisis is implicit throughout the WTO Appellate Body reports); Raj Bhala, The Myth
About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Part One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 845, 847-56 (1999) [hereinafter Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis]
(supporting the position that stare decisis operates in international law).
164 Bhala, The Power of the Past, supra note 163, at 878; accord Bhala, The Prece-
dent Setters, supra note 163, at 2; Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis, supra note 163,
at 847.
165 See supra Section 1.
166 Id.
167 See supra Section 1.4.A.
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created CRTA and respond to its critique of the planned RTA.168
Additionally, if there are any changes to an RTA, the CRTA must
be informed, and may once again subject the RTA to its recom-
mendations. 69 The Proposal goes beyond the issue of RTA forma-
tion by requiring that the WTO be involved in all aspects of an
RTA's life. The Proposal ensures transparency of the RTAs, at all
stages of their development.170 The Proposal allows the WTO Se-
cretariat to follow the RTA's development and to suggest where an
RTA may be straying off course. But the Proposal goes further and
provides that the "WTO Secretariat shall consider ways in which it
can assist RTAs with their institutional needs, including offering
the use of the WTO Secretariat to meet those RTA institutional
needs." 171 There would hence be the possibility that RTAs would
employ the WTO Secretariat for the RTA's institutional needs. By
using the Secretariat for the regulation and management of RTAs,
significant resource savings will occur for RTA members, who
would otherwise have to maintain a costly presence in the many
different countries where many different RTA Secretariat or insti-
tutional structures are located. These savings should make it easier
for resource-strapped developing countries to engage in more effi-
cient and effective RTAs. Having the institutional structure cen-
tralized will also assist in ensuring that RTAs remain consistent
with the WTO's requirements.
Recognizing the value of RTAs as the "laboratory" of trade pol-
icy, the Proposal provides for exceptions "[i]n order to facilitate in-
novation."172 The Proposal also takes into account the fact that cus-
toms unions are conceptually different as well, by providing an
exception for "arrangements suggesting significant integration of
168 Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Decision of the General Coun-
cil of 6 February 1996 [hereinafter "Terms of Reference of the CRTA"], WT/L/127,
available at http://w-ww.wto.org/english/tratop-e/region-e/regcom-e.htm (last
visited Mar. 4, 2005); see also WTO Understanding on Art. XXIV, supra note 66;
MATHIS, supra note 10, at 131 (describing the CRTA as a "standing review commit-
tee for regional trade agreements").
169 Understanding on Article XXIV, supra note 66, § 11; Terms of Reference of
the CRTA, supra note 168.
. 170 This would respond to the World Bank's suggestion of greater transpar-
ency of RTAs. See THE WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 4, at
vii (proposing to "increase transparency by empowering the WTO to collect and
regularly make public full details of all arrangements").
171 See supra Section 1.4.B.
172 See supra Section 1.5.A.
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members' economies and political structure." 73 Those exceptions,
however, are applied through a waiver, which itself requires "a
two-thirds approval of the WTO membership, following recom-
mendation of the... CRTA." 174 The two-thirds requirement is a
reasonable, but not too high, hurdle for RTAs to overcome in order
to receive the waiver.1 75 However, the requirement that the CRTA
Executive Committee must first recommend the waiver to the
WTO membership should allow some control of the waiver proc-
ess and reduce "log rolling" effects.176 Further consideration of the
CRTA membership and voting requirement would have to be un-
dertaken to ensure it can perform this important function.
To prevent the waivers from "gutting" the whole Proposal, the
waivers are further constrained through the Proposal provision
that "[s]uch waivers are presumptively inapplicable to non-
customs union arrangements." 77  This presumption of non-
applicability to non-customs union RTAs will strengthen the Pro-
posal, while permitting the special cases of "real" customs unions
to be protected from the Proposal. Customs unions, such as the
EU, are very different from the majority of RTAs, and the waiver
provision of the Proposal states that they are "arrangements sug-
gesting significant integration of members' economies and political
structure."178 Customs unions in fact, rather than just in name,
show a degree of internal harmonization and unification that sug-
gests something beyond the usual RTAs; this may imply that the
arrangement is on the path to becoming a confederation or a more
permanent and political union. Interfering in those endeavors
comes too close to interference in the internal workings of coun-
tries, and should generally be outside the scope of the Proposal, al-
though they would still be subject to the requirements unless a
waiver is obtained. The presumption against the waiver for non-
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Compare with the WTO's language on waivers. See WTO Agreement, su-
pra note 61, art. IX (3-4) (providing for waivers in "exceptional circumstances" for
a specific period, with review every year). See also GATT, supra note 5, arts. XXIV
(10), XXV (5).
176 Defined as "[aipplied in politics to the 'give and take' principle, by which
one party will further certain interests of another in return for help given in pass-
ing their own measures." BREWER'S DICIONARY OF PHRASE AND FABLE 655 (Centen-
ary 1970) (1959).
177 See supra Section 1.5.B.
178 See supra Section 1.5.A.
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customs union RTAs, as well as those RTAs that are customs un-
ions in name but not in actuality, also makes the waiver harder for
RTAs to obtain by ensuring that the presumption is against and not
in favor of the grant of the waivers. Finally, the waivers under the
Proposal "may [only] apply for a maximum of ten years, subject to
renewal under the same criteria as the original waiver."
179 This
time limitation is intended to force a reappraisal of the original
waivers in light of the development of the WTO and the RTA over
that time period.
Lastly, the Proposal recognizes that its application would be
complex. Accordingly, it would create a small Executive Commit-
tee of the WTO's Committee on Regional Trade Organizations to
consider the issues and to make the initial recommendations to the
WTO body as a whole. That body would be representative of the
WTO members, but also take into account the special status of the
largest exporting economies - in order to secure their support for
the Proposal and the committee, as well as to assuage their fears
about the powers such a committee may exercise. Furthermore,
the two-thirds requirement for the committee's recommendations
will also serve as a check on improvident or political machinations
reflected in the recommendations.
Certainly, this Proposal may be considered radical. However,
it may be that such a radical reorganization of the RTA-WTO rela-
tionship is necessary to save the WTO from marginalization.
Nonetheless, the specifics of the Proposal raise difficult issues and
may likely result in some negative consequences, which are dis-
cussed below, with possible mitigating factors juxtaposed.
6. CRITIQUE OF THE PROPOSAL
As an initial matter, it must be reemphasized that this Proposal
does not seek to eliminate RTAs, for their contributions and value
to the world trading system are undeniable.180 Rather, the Pro-
posal simply seeks to ensure that RTAs do not work to the detri-
ment of the WTO. RTAs are not a core value of the WTO, and,
hence, where there is a conflict between the WTO and RTAs, the
Proposal reflects the idea that it is the RTAs that should then be
modified so as to reduce or eliminate the conflict. Nonetheless, the
Proposal recognizes that RTAs are here to stay, but then seeks to
179 See supra Section 1.5.C.
180 Cho, Breaking the Barrier, supra note 73, at 452-55.
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mitigate their negative impact on the WTO while seeking to retain
their benefits. The provisions of the Proposal should not reduce
RTAs' ability to assist in regional economic integration, but should
enhance peace and security between countries, serve as a labora-
tory for trade law experimentation, or provide all the other benefits
discussed above. As with every change, there will be changes that
prove to be problematic. Those potential problems will be dis-
cussed below.
Perhaps the most significant drawback could be that the move-
ment towards free trade is chilled through the curtailment of the
proliferation of RTAs. To the extent one believes that RTAs
promote freer trade, stimulate the development of international
trade ideas, and mobilize resources for the goal of free trade, then
any diminishment of these roles would be harmful to the move-
ment towards free trade. And indeed, each RTA is a reduction in
protectionism and an incremental movement towards free trade,
albeit just by those countries within the RTA. 181 However, to the
extent that RTAs are hurting the WTO, they are themselves an ob-
stacle to free trade. That obstacle exists only to the extent that the
impact on global welfare and the move towards free trade is hurt
more than the WTO is helped. Figuring out the correct balance is
difficult, if not impossible. 182 Yet, given that RTAs are an exception
to the WTO, any uncertainty on the impact of a trade regulation
should be resolved in favor of the WTO.
An incongruous result of the Proposal may be that the WTO it-
self is hurt. For example, the Proposal will, in the short term, have
the opposite result intended as it will force trade policy makers to
concentrate on RTAs, adjusting them to comply with the Proposal,
thereby diverting them from work on the WTO. But after an initial
period of transition, there will be immediate savings in efficiencies
and transparencies, and the institutional harm caused by these
181 Indeed, that very limitation does undermine this argument, for every RTA
implies the maintenance of protectionism against non-RTA members, though the
level of protection after the creation of the RTA must not, on average, be greater
thah that before the RTA was formed. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXIV, § 5 ("[The
protections provided by an RTAI shall not on the whole be higher or more restric-
tive than the general incidence of the duties and regulations of commerce applica-
ble in the ... territories prior to the formation of the [RTA] ... "); see also Under-
standing on Art. XXIV, supra note 66, § 2 (clarifying how Article XXIV, § 5's
measurements shall be computed).
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RTAs will be greatly reduced. A similar situation occurred with
respect to the initiation of the Uruguay Round's "sunset review" of
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty ("AD/CVD") orders. Ini-
tially, there was a significantly increased level of activity in the liti-
gation of the old dumping/subsidies orders, but once the backlog
was dealt with, the activity level has abated.183 Thus, while it may
appear that the Proposal's initial impact would be the opposite of
that desired, such harm will be short-lived, and quickly offset.
To the extent that RTA formation is chilled by the Proposal, in-
dividual states may feel that they have lost the welfare and eco-
nomic benefits that preferential access provides. However, those
are short-term losses, for just as the state may gain an advantage in
one market through an RTA, it will consequently lose access to
other markets located in alien RTAs. In addition, given the signifi-
cant proliferation of RTAs, there will be many more markets lost
than gained. After all, the idea of multilateral trade and its belief
in non-discrimination through MFN supports the concept that in
the long term all states will be better off through equal non-
discriminatory access to free trade; an ideal that is frustrated by
RTAs.
Another critique of the Proposal may be that with rule har-
monization, there will be little to gain from being a member of an
RTA. Such an argument, however, fails to take into account that
much of the benefits of membership in an RTA are not through the
RTA's unique provisions, but through the preferential market ac-
cess- secured through special tariff bindings, rules of origin, and
other concessions between the RTA parties. While the Proposal
does provide that substantive rules would be harmonized to the
extent the rules concern the same issues, the Proposal leaves un-
touched the level of trade bindings, sectoral coverages, and other
reciprocal concessions. Furthermore, to the extent that the RTA is
innovative and covers issues and sectors not addressed by the
WTO agreements, it is not impacted by the Proposal. Accordingly,
the impression that the Proposal eliminates the advantages of
RTAs is largely false, and should not, therefore, serve to inhibit
183 See generally Peter A. Dohlman, Determinations of Adequacy in Sunset Re-
views of Antidumping Orders In The United States, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1281 (1999)
(examining determinations of adequacy in sunset reviews from three different
perspectives); see also Michael 0. Moore, Department of Commerce Administration of
Antidumping Sunset Reviews: A First Assessment, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 675 (2002) (ex-
amining recent Department of Commerce sunset review decisions).
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membership in RTAs.184
The Proposal may, however, negatively impact private trade
participants within RTA member states. With respect to specific
businesses, there may be some, though probably not many, that are
hurt through lost preferential access to markets based upon har-
monized rules or jurisprudence. Though, on balance, there may be
parties within the same state that find new markets in previously
inaccessible RTAs or that are able to take advantage of newly har-
monized rules.
In any event, it is far from clear that the Proposal would chill
the creation of RTAs or, in the aggregate, reduce the welfare bene-
fits of a state's industrial sector. Indeed, the opposite may be true,
and there may very likely be an increase in RTA activity and popu-
larity. This effect would be a consequence of the Proposal's provi-
sions on rule and institutional harmonization which would likely
make the creation of RTAs easier. RTAs would be easier to form
because there would be fewer issues over which countries would
disagree.185 Similarly, the employment of a centralized DSB and
Secretariat will make the RTAs less costly and more efficient.186 Al-
ternatively, though harmonization may lead to the reduction in ab-
solute numbers of RTAs as they join together. RTAs with standard
rules would find it easier to work together and eventually
merge.187
A related concern may be that the Proposal would result in a
"chilling" of RTA innovation. However, with respect to reducing
the role RTAs play as the "laboratory of trade policy," it is unlikely
that the Proposal, as drafted, would have that impact.188 The Pro-
184 One of the comments from the audience at the Bar Ilan symposium sug-
gested that the Proposal would essentially convert RTAs into something akin to
the WTO's Plurilateral Agreements.
185 See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PERSPECrIVES, supra note 4, at 143-44
(discussing harmonization of rules of origin).
186 The rules of origin issue is a perfect example of a very complex issue that
can fie up RTA negotiations as states and participants within the individual states
attempt to manipulate the rules of origin to obtain advantages -whereas the rules
should simply be there to help the RTA confine the advantages of the RTA to the
members themselves, and not be employed to achieve a substantive outcome.
187 FRANKEL, supra note 6, at 239-40. After all, if two different RTAs have dif-
ferent patent rules (e.g., whether a patent award goes to the first to file or first to
invent) they will find it difficult to join. Id. Indeed, this aspect of the Proposal
will further the goals of the Proposal as a reduced number of RTAs "cluttering the
international trade landscape" should result in less resource diversion, conflict
creation, and erosion of enthusiasm.
188 There is some suggestion that there is not much of this "laboratory effect"
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posal's "chilling" effect, if it occurs, would only impact those rules
important to the multilateral system and sufficiently common for
the CRTA to have determined the necessity of harmonization. The
Proposal's harmonization, would not, however, impact real areas
of innovation, especially those areas of trade and subjects presently
not a part of the WTO, such as labor, competition, environment,
and human rights. For those reasons, the Proposal would likely
not serve to erode the "laboratory" benefit of RTAs, while any
potential chilling effect of the Proposal would likely be off-set by
the aspects of the Proposal that make RTAs easier to form and
more efficient.
Another perceived issue is that while there may be increased
efficiencies enjoyed by the RTAs as a result of the Proposal, the
Proposal's increased role for the WTO Secretariat may create an in-
efficient and bloated civil service. Furthermore, there may be con-
cern that the newly enlarged Secretariat would serve to erode state
sovereignty -sovereignty already perceived to be significantly di-
minished in the modem globalized world. However, to the extent
there is any transfer of sovereignty, it is a transfer from RTAs,
themselves already the recipient of any sovereignty given up by
member states. Therefore, there is no new diminishment of state
sovereignty. Furthermore, the sovereignty issue is a "red herring,"
as countries are constantly agreeing to constrain their behavior
through international agreements and through the transfer or
delegation of some activities to international organizations such as
the United Nations or the Red Cross. Allowing the WTO Secre-
tariat a larger role in RTAs would therefore not be so novel. The
other side of this argument, that the Secretariat would become a
bloated inefficient body, may have some merit for it is all too often
true that organizations evolve into such entities. However, it is not
automatic that they should undergo that transformation. Careful
monitoring by WTO members could ensure that the Secretariat
remains efficient and responsive.
Another broad institutional critique is that the Proposal is un-
necessary as the WTO's DSB will serve to protect the WTO. But
the DSB is not necessarily a sufficient protector of the institutional
going on -as there are few "high level integration" RTAs like NAFTA and the EU
to provide the new ideas. See MATHIS, supra note 10, at 123-25 (noting that "ad-
vanced examples of integration are few" in response to the idea that regionalism
might allow countries to achieve higher levels of integration). See also Cho, Break-
ing the Barrier, supra note 73, at 433 ("RTAs tend to provide test laboratories for the
multilateral trading system.").
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viability of the WTO in the face of competition from RTAs. The
DSB would fail to provide that protection because as a judicial
body it focuses on the specific conflicts in the context of a "case or
controversy." It is hard to imagine how the DSB would deal with a
case involving the institutional issues discussed in this Article.
While the DSB may deal with conflicts of rules in specific and nar-
row contexts, it is unlikely to address diversion of resources or ero-
sion of enthusiasm.
At a more specific level, there are potential issues relating to
individual provisions of the Proposal. For example, the waiver
provisions may prove to be particularly problematic. The multilat-
eral trade system's experience with waivers and grandfather rights
is "checkered," to say the least. The Grandfather Clause of the
GATT 1947's Protocol of Provisional Application is the preeminent
example of that past, with all of its destructive impact on the trade
system in the ensuing decades. 89 For sure, each of the Proposal's
provisions could be examined under a microscope and many po-
tential problems identified. Such a detailed critique, however, is
unnecessary pending, if ever, any serious consideration of the Pro-
posal's provisions. Until that time, broad criticisms serve the use-
ful goal of furthering the examination of the underlying institu-
tional critique of RTAs.
Perhaps the single most pertinent, and most likely accurate, cri-
tique of the Proposal is that it is too radical to be acceptable to the
WTO's membership. Consequently, it is unlikely to engender
much support among WTO members.190 Certainly, all proposals
for change at the WTO face serious hurdles, especially ones con-
cerning such widespread practices as the use of RTAs. 191 In addi-
tion to the usual barriers to change present in an international or-
189 See PPA, supra note 159, at 308 (providing for immediate application of
Article I and II of GATr, while part III of GATT, which includes Articles III to
XXIII, is to be applied "to the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legisla-
tion"). The relaxed use of the waiver provisions of GATT also comes to mind, and
may be viewed quite negatively by WTO membership in light of the advances in
strengthening the waiver provisions in the WTO. See WTO Agreement, supra note
61, art. IX, paras. 3-4 (discussing the granting of waivers of obligations under the
Agreement by the Ministerial Conference); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 55-57,69 (2d. ed.
1997) (discussing the GATT waiver provisions).
190 See WORLD BANK, TRADE BLOCS, supra note 14, at 111-12 ("[M]ajor political
backing for tightening [rules on RTAs] looks improbable .... ").
191 See, e.g., WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 112
(noting that progress on provisions easing labor force mobility has been limited).
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ganization such as the WTO, in this case there are additional sig-
nificant problems. Perhaps the most troublesome barrier to the
Proposal is that the two superpowers of the WTO, the EU, itself an
RTA, and the United States, are themselves significant users of
RTAs. It has even been remarked that they are almost in competi-
tion with each other: "What we see when we look at the pattern of
regional expansion in the world today is essentially two focal
points with concentric circles of preferential trade arrangements
radiating outwards -almost as if they were competing to see who
can establish the greatest number of preferential areas the fast-
est."'1
9 2
Nonetheless, there is merit to proposing such a radical solution
to a problem. Like a "straw man" set up to "take a fall" there are
advantages to a consideration of the Proposal. 93 By alerting the
WTO to this institutional attack, perhaps the WTO may undertake
its own examination of these issues and make its own proposals for
their resolution. The Proposal here is certainly a radical response
to the problem, but then it may set the discussion in motion, and
perhaps provide direction to that important conversation. Each
part of the Proposal, from the widespread applicability to the
waiver provisions, raises specific issues that are of concern to the
problem of institutional conflict between the WTO and RTAs. To
the extent each provision encounters opposition, the articulation of
that opposition is a positive development towards an eventual so-
lution to the problem.
Of course, while the Proposal as a whole may be unacceptable,
there is a greater possibility that individual parts of the provision
could be acceptable. In other words, the Proposal's provisions are
severable. Thus, for example, the Proposal's provision requiring
WTO jurisprudence to be directly applicable within RTAs, or that
the WTO's DSB would be the final body of appeal of RTA disputes
is, perhaps, not so controversial or, even if so controversial, could
stand a better chance of being accepted if considered alone. Alter-
natively, this Proposal may not need to be implemented through
amendment of the WTO agreements. Rather there are other ave-
nues available: state commitments, adoption of procedures by the
192 MATHis, supra note 10, at 132 (quoting Renatto Ruggiero, Address to the
Third Conference of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (Nov. 7, 1997)).
193 A "straw man" or "man of straw" is, among other things, "an imaginary
adversary, or an invented adverse argument, adduced in order to be triumphantly
confuted .... THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICIONARY 1090 (1933).
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WTO Secretariat, or the CRTA could become more involved in the
issues raised in this Article. So even though the Proposal as a
whole may be unacceptable, there are alternative mechanisms un-
der which the Proposal's goals may stand a chance of acceptance
when considered alone.
7. CONCLUSION
While there is no shortage of factors to blame for the slow de-
velopment of the WTO, this Article has suggested one additional
factor: the institutional conflict between RTAs and the WTO. This
Article offers a Proposal to respond to this institutional threat. The
Proposal suggests substantive harmonization and institutional cen-
tralization of RTAs with the WTO. Certainly the likelihood of the
adoption of a formal amendment, this one in particular, to the
WTO is unlikely, especially one that would require states to act
selflessly. Nonetheless, this Proposal and the reasoning behind it
may serve to remind WTO members of their obligations to the
WTO, and that the WTO is not immortal. The Proposal and the is-
sues raised in this Article should serve as a wake-up call to WTO
members. The United States, Europe, Canada, Brazil, China, Ja-
pan, Australia, and the other big players should take a stand as
parties with the largest global trade and the ones most likely to suf-
fer from the harms caused to the WTO by these RTAs. Addition-
ally, as some of the most significant users of RTAs, they should
also take responsibility for their role in this problem and seek to
rectify the damage and avert the potential disaster their RTA's may
produce.
Of course, there is another route to resolve this battle between
RTAs and the WTO. That route would be through the WTO taking
into account the reasons for the growth and strength of these
RTAs: simply put, its failure to give its members what they want.
Unfortunately, the desires of its members are far from uniform and
are often mutually exclusive. Broadly speaking, for the developing
world, those demands include reform of agriculture policies, intel-
lectual property protections that take into account the realities of
developing countries' needs, and so on. But then, and also broadly
speaking, the demands of the developed world include a faster
pace of liberalization, reduction of NTBs, expansion into new and
related areas such as competition law, and so on. Although pro-
gress on these issues is almost as unrealistic as the Proposal itself,
perhaps the Proposal, when compared to the alternatives, is the
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least harmful way to resolve the issue, and as such may not appear
so unrealistic after all.
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